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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Three Essays on Taxation. (August 2007) 
 
Kirsten Abram Cook, A.A., McLennan Community College; 
 
B.B.A., Baylor University; 
 
M.Acc., Baylor University 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Michael R. Kinney 
 
 
This dissertation contains three essays. The first essay examines the response of 
equity values to the announcement of a decrease in the capital gains tax rate. The 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 reduced the long-term capital gains tax rate. News of this 
rate reduction reached investors in late April to early May of 1997. During the week of 
this event, firms with appreciated stock positions, average holding periods of at least one 
year, and individual marginal investors reported lower returns than companies lacking 
one or more of these characteristics. 
The second essay builds on recent research reporting that firms establish target 
capital structures by weighing the costs and benefits of debt and that adjustment costs 
dictate how rapidly companies move toward optimal leverage ratios. If tax 
considerations impact debt levels of the firms, taxes are also likely to influence the rates 
of adjustment to target levels. Among high-tax firms, companies below the optimal 
leverage ratios respond more quickly than companies above the targets because high-tax 
firms can better utilize the interest deductions generated by issuing additional debt to 
reduce tax liabilities. Among low-tax firms, companies above the target capital 
 iv 
structures adjust more rapidly than companies below the goals because low-tax firms 
have less need of interest deductions to decrease tax burdens and, thus, sacrifice less tax 
benefit when retiring debt. 
The third essay demonstrates that manufacturing firms manipulate production to 
manage earnings and examines whether tax incentives magnify or temper this strategy. 
Companies that exceed the quarterly consensus analyst forecasts absent the earnings 
effects of discretionary inventory changes cut production and create an earnings cookie 
jar for future quarters. For this sub-sample, companies make larger discretionary 
inventory decreases as the marginal tax rates rise in the fourth quarter relative to the first 
three quarters. In contrast, the sub-sample of firms that miss income goals without 
manipulating production use discretionary inventory increases to enhance earnings and 
potentially reach benchmarks. Higher tax rates do not impede miss firms from managing 
earnings upward; however, considerations of tax timing dissuade these companies from 
opportunistically manipulating production in the fourth quarter. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION
1
 
 
 
This dissertation contains three essays. The first essay examines the response of 
equity values to the announcement of a decrease in the capital gains tax rate. The 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 reduced the long-term capital gains tax rate from 28 to 20 
percent. News of this rate reduction reached investors in late April to early May of 1997. 
During the event week, results indicate that firms with appreciated stock positions, 
average holding periods of at least one year, and individual marginal investors reported 
lower returns than companies with depreciated stock positions, average holding periods 
of less than one year, or institutional marginal investors. This stock price reaction during 
the event week is consistent with investors anticipating a lessening of the lock-in effect: 
The TRA97 rate cut decreased transaction costs for individual stockholders with long-
term capital gains, and firms with marginal investors subject to the new, lower rate 
experienced a less favorable stock price reaction to the announcement of the cut than 
companies with marginal investors not subject to this reduced rate. 
The second essay builds on recent research reporting that firms establish target 
capital structures by weighing the costs and benefits of debt and that adjustment costs 
dictate how rapidly companies move toward their optimal leverage ratios. If tax 
considerations impact firms’ debt levels then taxes are also likely to influence their rates 
of adjustment to target levels. The purpose of this paper is to examine this issue 
empirically. Specifically, I hypothesize that, among high-tax firms, companies below 
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their optimal leverage ratios respond more quickly than companies above their targets 
because high-tax firms can better utilize the interest deductions generated by issuing 
additional debt to reduce their tax liabilities. Conversely, I expect that, among low-tax 
firms, companies above their target capital structures adjust more rapidly than 
companies below their goals because low-tax firms have less need of interest deductions 
to decrease their tax burdens and thus sacrifice less tax benefit when retiring debt. 
Empirical evidence supports these predictions. 
The third essay demonstrates that manufacturing firms manipulate production to 
manage earnings and examines whether tax incentives magnify or temper this strategy. 
Companies that exceed their quarterly consensus analyst forecasts absent the earnings 
effects of discretionary inventory changes cut production (relative to sales), creating an 
earnings “cookie jar” for future quarters. For this sub-sample, tax and financial reporting 
incentives are aligned; thus, these companies make larger discretionary inventory 
decreases as their marginal tax rates rise and in the fourth quarter relative to the first 
three quarters. In contrast, the sub-sample of firms that miss their income goals without 
manipulating production use discretionary inventory increases to enhance their earnings 
and potentially reach their benchmarks. For these companies, friction exists between tax 
and financial reporting incentives. Results indicate that higher tax rates do not impede 
miss firms from managing their earnings upward; however, tax timing considerations 
dissuade these companies from opportunistically manipulating production in the fourth 
quarter. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
STOCK PRICE REACTION TO A REDUCTION 
 
IN THE CAPITAL GAINS TAX RATE 
 
 
Introduction 
From 1987 to 1997, individual taxpayers in the United States faced a maximum 
capital gains tax rate of 28 percent on capital investments held for more than one year. 
On August 5, 1997, President Clinton signed the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97) 
into law. This act reduced the highest long-term capital gains tax rate from 28 to 20 
percent. Investors anticipated this capital gains tax rate reduction several months before 
President Clinton signed the bill. News of a balanced budget agreement, including a 
provision for capital gains tax relief, reached investors in late April and early May of 
1997. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of this news on stock prices. 
The literature to date offers conflicting predictions concerning the impact of a 
change in the capital gains tax rate on security prices. Studies by Collins and Kemsley 
(2000) and Lang and Shackelford (2000) support tax capitalization theory and show that 
equity values increase when capital gains taxes decrease. To the contrary, research by 
Meade (1990) and Klein (1999) demonstrates that a reduction in the capital gains tax 
rate lowers stock sellers’ transaction costs, thereby lowering stock prices. Thus, the 
association between capital gains taxes and equity values is unsettled and ripe for 
empirical investigation. My study responds to the call from Graham (2003) for “more 
market evidence about the importance of personal taxes affecting asset prices” (p. 1120). 
To examine this relationship, I first corroborate the finding from Lang and 
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Shackelford (2000) that, during the event week in 1997 when news of a capital gains tax 
rate reduction reached the market, dividend-paying firms experienced lower returns than 
other companies. Then, I extend this research stream by empirically examining three 
mandatory conditions for capital gains tax rate changes to influence security prices. 
Specifically, I determine if the marginal investor realizes a capital gain or loss when 
selling his stock, ascertain if the marginal investor qualifies for long-term tax treatment 
by retaining his stock for the required holding period, and categorize the marginal 
investor as either an individual or an institution. I expect that stock prices reacted to 
news of the TRA97 rate cut in accordance with investors’ positions in their stock 
(appreciated or depreciated), their holding periods (long- or short-term), and their tax 
status (individual or institutional). To this end, I adapt measures of stock price 
appreciation/depreciation from Guenther (2000), holding period length from Liang et al. 
(2002), and tax status from Ayers et al. (2002) and combine these variables in a single 
model to ascertain how shareholders’ tax characteristics influence the impact of news of 
a capital gains tax rate reduction on equity values. 
According to Liang et al. (2002), “If the marginal investor of a security is a 
nontaxable entity or is able to avoid paying capital gains taxes, then the price of that 
particular security will not be affected by investor-level tax rates” (p. 50). To my 
knowledge, my study is the first in the capital gains tax capitalization research stream to 
measure the tax status of the marginal investor and examine how stock price reaction 
differs based on this characteristic.
1 
Descriptive statistics indicate that, during the event week, firms whose stock 
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prices appreciated in the year prior to news of the TRA97 rate cut reaching the market 
experienced lower returns than companies with depreciated equity values. Returns 
during the event week were larger for firms with short-term average holding periods than 
for companies with long-term average holding periods. Firms with individual marginal 
investors experienced a less-favorable stock price reaction during the event week than 
firms with institutional marginal investors. Regression results show that firms possessing 
all three of these characteristics (appreciated stock price, long-term average holding 
period, and individual marginal investor) earned lower event-week returns than 
companies lacking one of more of these traits; this response of equity values during the 
event week is consistent with investors anticipating a lessening of the lock-in effect. 
Although the overall stock price reaction to the news of the TRA97 tax rate cut was 
positive, this response was muted for firms with marginal shareholders subject to the 
new, lower rate (that is, individual stockholders with long-term capital gains). These 
results are robust to a variety of alternate sample, model, and variable specifications. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section reviews 
previous publications that examine stock price reactions to tax rate changes. The 
following section lists and discusses the conditions necessary for a change in the capital 
gains tax rate to affect stock prices. I then detail my sample selection technique, present 
my hypotheses, and preview the methods that I use to test these hypotheses. The 
subsequent two sections present descriptive statistics and regression results, including 
primary tests, economic significance, and sensitivity analyses. I then compare my 
findings to those of a contemporaneous working paper, Dai et al. (2006). The final 
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section concludes and outlines avenues for future research. 
Background and Prior Research 
Prior to TRA97, both the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) and the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA81) modified capital gains tax rates. These two tax 
acts involved protracted congressional debate and numerous changes to the Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC). Thus, neither tax act affords researchers a clean setting for 
examining the stock market’s reaction to a capital gains tax rate change. The same is true 
of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA03), which 
simultaneously reduced dividend and capital gains tax rates. In contrast, TRA97 
provides researchers with an uncommonly powerful setting to study stock price 
response. This legislation was not as complex or controversial as the other tax law 
changes (Shackelford 2000), and information about the capital gains tax rate reduction 
associated with TRA97 came as a surprise to investors (Liang et al. 2002). Thus, 
researchers can isolate price effects attributable to news of this change because security 
prices impounded the information during a brief period without other contemporaneous 
IRC modifications confounding the association. 
Early finance studies such as Miller and Scholes (1978) assert that a 
corporation’s dividend policy does not affect shareholder wealth or firm value. However, 
more recent accounting studies contradict this conclusion (for example, Harris and 
Kemsley 1999 and Collins and Kemsley 2000).
2
 In the economics literature, Klein 
(1999) develops a lock-in effect model to examine the relationship between capital gains 
taxes and stock prices. Landsman and Shackelford (1995) define the lock-in effect as the 
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disincentive to dispose of an appreciated asset in a taxable transaction that will generate 
capital gains taxes on the accrued appreciation. Klein demonstrates that stock sellers 
treat capital gains taxes as transaction costs and expect compensation from buyers to 
cover these costs, resulting in a direct association between capital gains taxes and equity 
values. According to Klein’s model, when the capital gains tax rate falls, shareholders’ 
willingness to sell increases and stock prices decrease. 
Meade (1990) also studies the lock-in effect and provides experimental evidence 
complementing the prediction of Klein’s model. The author reaches three conclusions. 
First, the imposition of a capital gains tax creates a lock-in effect. Second, this lock-in 
effect decreases investment in new assets. Third, reducing the capital gains tax rate 
mitigates the lock-in effect and increases investment in new assets. Given that investors 
maximize after-tax wealth by selling current investments and using the proceeds to 
invest in new assets with higher risk-adjusted returns, a reduction in the capital gains tax 
rate encourages investment in these new assets by lowering the transactions costs 
associated with the sale of the current investments. 
Lang and Shackelford (2000) employ a traditional event-study methodology to 
examine the influence of an expected change in the capital gains tax rate on stock prices. 
The authors assume that stockholders weigh the expected capital gains tax rate more 
heavily when assessing firms with low dividend yields. Thus, they hypothesize and find 
that stock returns surrounding the announcement of a capital gains tax rate cut are 
negatively correlated with firm dividend yields. However, Lang and Shackelford do not 
study the impact of marginal investors’ tax characteristics on their results; that is, the 
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authors’ regression model does not incorporate shareholders’ gain/loss positions in their 
stock, their holding periods, or their tax status. 
Required Conditions 
Shackelford (2000) outlines seven conditions that must hold for a change in the 
capital gains tax rate to influence equity prices: 
1. A change in the capital gains tax rate must force the marginal investor to revise his 
expectations concerning the tax rate that will apply when he disposes of his stock. 
2. The marginal investor must plan to dispose of his stock in a taxable transaction such 
as a sale in the secondary market, a share repurchase, or a corporate liquidation. 
3. If a capital gains tax rate change makes an asset attractive to a new group of 
investors, any upward price pressure generated by that new group purchasing the 
asset must not be offset by downward price pressure created by the old group of 
investors selling the asset to avoid declining returns. 
4. The marginal investor must comply with applicable tax laws by paying the capital 
gains tax liability created by disposing of his stock. 
5. The marginal investor must recognize a net long-term capital gain; that is, his long-
term capital gains must exceed his long-term capital losses and the excess of short-
term capital losses over short-term capital gains. If the investor holds only one stock, 
that security must have appreciated in value. 
6. The marginal investor must hold his stock for a sufficient period of time to receive 
long-term tax treatment. 
7. The marginal investor must be an individual or a flow-through entity such as a 
partnership or S corporation that passes capital gains to individuals. 
In their review of empirical tax research, specifically those studies that examine 
the association between equity prices and investor taxes, Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) 
note that capital gains tax capitalization is a relatively unexplored area compared with 
dividend tax capitalization. The authors assert that one reason for the dearth of studies 
examining the relationship between capital gains taxes and stock prices is that the seven 
conditions outlined in Shackelford (2000) do not hold simultaneously for most firms. 
Studies such as Lang and Shackelford (2000) that investigate the impact of a capital 
gains tax rate change on security values implicitly assume that these seven conditions 
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occur because some of them are difficult or impossible to test empirically. For example, 
without access to confidential tax return data and brokerage statements, researchers 
cannot verify that the marginal investor complies with tax laws by reporting the correct 
amount of income from capital gains and remitting the associated tax liability to the US 
Treasury.
3
 
Other researchers have extended Lang and Shackelford (2000), but none has 
explicitly tested these conditions. For example, Guenther (2000) investigates whether the 
positive stock price reaction to the news of the TRA97 rate cut is attributable to a sellers’ 
strike. He partitions his overall sample of dividend-paying firms into sub-samples of 
corporations whose stock prices increased and decreased, respectively, in the year prior 
to the announcement. Guenther finds that the appreciation sub-sample reacted favorably 
to the news while the depreciation sub-sample failed to exhibit the same response. The 
author concludes that, as investors postponed the sales of appreciated equity securities 
until the effective date of the capital gains tax rate cut, this sellers’ strike explains the 
results from Lang and Shackelford (2000). For purposes of this study, I employ 
Guenther’s measure of stock price appreciation/depreciation to examine the fifth 
required condition listed previously.
4 
Liang et al. (2002) advance the capital gains tax capitalization literature stream 
by investigating the impact of a stock’s expected holding period on price reaction to a 
tax rate change. To proxy for the length of the holding period, the authors calculate the 
inverse of the firm’s share turnover ratio, operationalized as total shares outstanding at 
yearend divided by shares traded during the year. They assume that, as the length of the 
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holding period increases, the present value of the capital gains tax decreases, thereby 
reducing the benefit of a capital gains tax rate reduction. Thus, Liang et al. hypothesize 
that a firm’s stock price reaction to the announcement of the rate cut inversely relates to 
the length of the stock’s expected holding period and find evidence of this negative 
association. I use the authors’ estimate of expected holding period length to study the 
sixth required condition from Shackelford (2000). 
Ayers et al. (2002) examine a change in the dividend tax rate rather than the 
capital gains tax rate. They regress weekly abnormal stock returns surrounding the 
announcement of a dividend tax rate increase on firm dividend yield, the tax status of 
each firm’s marginal investor, and the interaction of these two variables. The authors 
predict and find that, the higher is a firm’s dividend yield, the more negative is the stock 
price reaction to a dividend tax rate increase. They also find that this negative effect is 
greater for firms with low levels of institutional ownership, an indication that the 
marginal investor is taxable. Ayers et al. highlight the importance of including the tax 
status of a firm’s marginal investor in models relating stock returns to investor taxes. 
Thus, I borrow this measure from Ayers et al. (2002) in order to investigate the seventh 
required condition from Shackelford (2000). 
Available data permit me to test only three of the seven requirements, and firms 
that lack one or more of the remaining four conditions contribute noise to my analyses. 
Thus, finding support for my hypotheses despite this noise would bolster the reliability 
of my results. 
 
  
11 
1
1
 
Hypotheses, Data, and Methodology 
Lang and Shackelford (2000) examine the influence of dividend yield on stock 
price reaction to news of the capital gains tax rate reduction included in TRA97.
5
 I use 
the following model from their study as a foundation for investigating how shareholders’ 
tax characteristics influence the impact of the TRA97 rate cut announcement on equity 
values: 
Retjt = 0 + 1 Eventt + 2 Divj + 3 Eventt • Divj + k X + jt (II-1) 
where 
Retjt = raw stock return for sample firm j in week t (t includes five weeks from 
4/15/97 to 5/19/97) 
Eventt = an indicator variable coded 1 if week t is 4/29/97 to 5/5/97 (event week) and 
0 otherwise 
Divj = (a) an indicator variable coded 1 if firm j paid cash dividends on common 
stock for the 1996 fiscal year and 0 otherwise 
 (b) a continuous variable measuring firm j’s cash dividends on common 
stock for the 1996 fiscal year deflated by firm market value at 12/31/96 
X = a vector of control variables for firm j’s attributes associated with returns, 
including size, profitability, leverage, growth opportunities, the equal-
weighted market return in week t, and industry indicator variables 
Table II-1 defines the variables used in all subsequent tables in the chapter. 
To estimate Model (II-1), I collect relevant data for the 2,500 largest corporations 
in the Compustat database based on firm market value at December 31, 1996.
6
 I 
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Table II-1. Chapter II Variable Definitions 
 
Ret = weekly stock return for the five trading weeks from 4/15/97 to 5/19/97 
Event = 1 if the trading week is 4/29/97 to 5/5/97 and 0 otherwise 
DDiv = 1 if the firm paid common stock dividends for the 1996 fiscal year and 0 otherwise 
CDiv = common stock dividends for the 1996 fiscal year deflated by firm market value at 12/31/96 
DApp = 1 if the firm's stock price appreciated from 4/28/96 to 4/28/97 and 0 otherwise 
CApp = cumulative stock return during the year from 4/28/96 to 4/28/97 
DHP = 1 if the firm's common shares outstanding at 12/31/96 exceed the common shares traded during 1996 and 0 otherwise 
CHP = common shares outstanding at 12/31/96 divided by common shares traded during 1996 
DMarg = 1 if the firm's marginal investor is an individual and 0 otherwise 
CMarg = percentage of common shares outstanding at 12/31/96 owned by individual investors 
EWRet = equal-weighted weekly return of the relevant market index 
Size = natural logarithm of firm market value at 12/31/96 
Prof = 1996 income before extraordinary items deflated by firm market value at 12/31/96 
Lev = total liabilities at 12/31/96 deflated by firm market value at 12/31/96 
Grow = book value of common equity at 12/31/96 deflated by firm market value at 12/31/96 
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calculate firm market value as the product of closing price (Compustat data item 24) and 
common shares outstanding (Compustat data item 25). Of the 2,500 initial sample firms, 
I conduct analyses on the 1,515 companies with complete data. Table II-2 displays the 
derivation of this final sample size. 
The response variable, Ret, is the weekly raw stock return for each sample firm 
for each of the five trading weeks from April 15 to May 19, 1997, obtained from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily stock database. For comparability 
of results, I select the same announcement period examined by Lang and Shackelford 
(2000) and Liang et al. (2002) as my event week.
7
 Thus, Event is an indicator variable 
coded 1 for the week from April 29 to May 5, 1997, and 0 otherwise. According to Lang 
and Shackelford (2000), the White House and Congress appear to have resolved most of 
the uncertainty surrounding the balanced budget agreement and the associated capital 
gains tax rate reduction during this week.
8
 The two weeks preceding and the two weeks 
succeeding the event week control for the association between firm dividend policy and 
stock returns during non-event periods. A positive coefficient 1 provides evidence that 
share prices increased during the week that news of the capital gains tax rate reduction 
reached the market. 
Alternatively, I could examine stock price reaction following May 7, 1997, the 
effective date of the TRA97 capital gains tax rate reduction. Guenther (2000) cites 
several articles from the popular and financial press contending that, because the timing 
of the rate cut remained uncertain until May 7, investors likely refrained from selling 
their securities during my event week (p. 4). Thus, if evidence of an attenuation of the 
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Table II-2. Chapter II Sample Size Derivation  
   
Original sample containing the largest corporations in the Compustat database 2,500  
Firms lacking sufficient data to calculate:  
 Event- and non-event-week firm and market returns (Ret and EWRet) 415  
 Dividend yield (DDiv and CDiv) 445  
 Stock price appreciation/depreciation (DApp and CApp) 1  
 Holding period length (DHP and CHP) 19  
 Marginal investor tax status (DMarg and CMarg) 94  
 Control variables (Size, Prof, Lev, Grow) 11  
Final sample 1,515  
   
I rank firms based on firm market value at December 31, 1996.  
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lock-in effect requires documenting an increase in actual asset sales to be descriptive, the 
five trading days from May 7 to 13, 1997 constitute a superior event week. However, in 
an efficient capital market, equity values fully reflect available information. Thus, when 
news of the TRA97 rate cut reached the market, I assume that investors revalued the 
securities in their portfolios accordingly and that stock prices impounded this 
information immediately. That is, I posit that the announcement of the rate cut increased 
investors’ willingness to sell their assets at some point in the future and that stock prices 
reacted to this anticipation of a lessening of the lock-in effect. Given that the purpose of 
this chapter is to determine how shareholders’ tax attributes affected the impact of the 
announcement on equity values, the five trading days from April 29 to May 5, 1997 
comprise an appropriate event week. However, in the final section of this study, I 
examine stock price reaction during the “effective date week” (May 7 to 13, 1997) and 
compare my results to those of Dai et al. (2006), a contemporaneous working paper that 
also ventures to distinguish between the capitalization and lock-in effects and their 
unique impacts on equity values surrounding the TRA97 tax rate reduction. 
I use two alternate specifications of Div to represent the dividend policy of 
sample firms. First, DDiv is an indicator variable coded 1 for firms that paid cash 
dividends on common shares (Compustat data item 21) during the 1996 fiscal year and 0 
otherwise. Second, CDiv is a continuous variable measuring firm dividend yield, 
calculated as 1996 common dividends deflated by firm market value at December 31, 
1996. Consistent with Lang and Shackelford (2000), my first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: During the event week (Event=1), firms that paid dividends (DDiv=1) experienced 
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lower returns than companies that did not pay dividends (DDiv=0). The magnitude 
of underperformance increases with firm dividend yield (CDiv). 
A negative coefficient for 3 supports this hypothesis. 
Following Lang and Shackelford (2000), Liang et al. (2002), and Ayers et al. 
(2002), I include several control variables in Model (II-1).
9
 Size is the natural logarithm 
of firm market value at December 31, 1996. Prof represents firm profitability, defined as 
1996 income before extraordinary items (Compustat data item 18) deflated by firm 
market value at December 31, 1996. Lev represents firm leverage, calculated as total 
liabilities (Compustat data item 181) divided by firm market value, both measured at 
December 31, 1996. Grow represents firm growth opportunities, operationalized as book 
value of common equity (Compustat data item 11) deflated by firm market value, both 
collected at December 31, 1996. EWRet is the equal-weighted weekly return of the 
relevant market index for each sample firm.
10
 Including a market return control variable 
incorporates a measure of beta into the model. Thus, including beta as a separate control 
variable for firm risk would be redundant. To ensure that results are not driven by 
variation among industries, I include indicator variables for two-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code industry membership. 
Consistent with the lock-in effect model from Klein (1999) and experimental 
evidence from Meade (1990), around the time that Congress agreed to a balanced fiscal 
1998 budget in early May 1997, numerous articles in the business press predicted that a 
capital gains tax rate cut would depress stock prices in the short run because investors 
would react to this news by selling appreciated shares. For example, on May 5, 1997, 
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The Wall Street Journal reported, “…a burst of selling may hit the markets, strategists 
say. That could be the reaction, at least temporarily, as investors with big long-term 
profits rush to lock in their gains” (p. C1). However, Panel B of Table II-3, which I 
discuss at length later in the chapter, displays that both dividend-paying and non-
dividend-paying firms experienced positive returns during the event week when news of 
the capital gains tax rate reduction reached investors, indicating that this provision in 
TRA97 represented good news for the entire market. The mean return for all sample 
firms during the event week was 7.925 percent, supporting capitalization theory. From 
this evidence, Lang and Shackelford (2000) conclude, “The bull market appears to have 
overwhelmed any downward price pressure created by a lessening of the lock-in effect” 
(p. 83). 
I posit that examining the relative impacts of the capitalization and lock-in 
effects using a sample of firms partitioned on dividend policy is inadequate because this 
approach does not consider how news of the capital gains tax rate reduction affected 
stock prices differently depending on investors’ tax attributes. For example, a lower 
capital gains tax rate provides greater motivation for an individual investor with an 
appreciated position in the stock of a dividend-paying firm to sell his stock and lock in 
his gain at the new, lower tax rate than an institutional investor with a depreciated 
position in the stock of a non-dividend-paying firm. Thus, a firm’s particular dividend 
policy is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to motivate its investors to 
dispose of their stock in the company in response to a capital gains tax rate drop. Rather, 
I predict that equity values also reacted to the news of the TRA97 rate cut according to 
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investors’ positions in their stock (appreciated or depreciated), their holding periods 
(long- or short- term), and their tax status (individual or institutional). I use Model (II-2) 
to investigate this prediction: 
Retjt = 0 + 1 Eventt + 2 Divj + 3 Appj + 4 HPj + 5 Margj + 6 Eventt • Divj + 7 
Eventt • Appj • HPj • Margj + k X + jt  (II-2) 
where 
Appj = (a) an indicator variable coded 1 if the firm’s stock price appreciated from 
4/28/96 to 4/28/97 and 0 otherwise 
 (b) a continuous variable measuring firm j’s cumulative stock return during 
the year from 4/28/96 to 4/28/97 
HPj = (a) an indicator variable coded 1 if the firm’s number of common shares 
outstanding at 12/31/96 exceed the number of common shares traded 
during 1996 and 0 otherwise 
 (b) a continuous variable measuring the number of common shares 
outstanding at 12/31/96 divided by number of common shares traded 
during 1996 
Margj = (a) an indicator variable coded 1 if firm j’s marginal investor is an individual 
and 0 otherwise 
 (b) a continuous variable measuring the percentage of common shares 
outstanding at 12/31/96 owned by individual investors 
All other variables in this model are operationalized in the same manner as those in 
Model (II-1). 
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Similar to Div in Model (II-1), I use two alternative specifications of App, HP, 
and Marg.
11
 DApp is an indicator variable coded 1 for sample companies whose 
common stock increased in value during the year immediately preceding the event week 
and 0 otherwise. I obtain daily returns for each trading day from April 28, 1996 to April 
28, 1997 for each sample firm and cumulate these returns over this 12-month period.
12
 If 
the cumulative return is positive, I code the DApp variable for that firm as 1 and 0 
otherwise. Following Guenther (2000), CApp is a continuous variable representing each 
firm’s cumulative stock return during the 12-month accumulation period.13 
In keeping with Liang et al. (2000), CHP is a continuous variable measuring the 
number of common shares outstanding at December 31, 1996 for each sample firm 
divided by the number of that company’s common shares traded during 1996.14 A value 
of 1.0 for the CHP variable indicates that all shares outstanding at yearend were traded 
once during the year, implying that the firm’s average holding period is exactly one year. 
Marginal investors in firms with CHP exceeding 1.0 have long-term holding periods for 
their shares, and those with values under 1.0 have short-term holding periods.
15
 
Although this variable is not a perfect proxy for the length of the marginal investor’s 
holding period, the magnitude of this variable and the length of the holding period are 
positively related. Thus, as CHP increases, so does the probability that the marginal 
investor in that firm’s stock has held his shares for the period necessary to receive 
preferential long-term tax treatment. DHP is an indicator variable coded 1 for sample 
firms with CHP exceeding 1.0 and 0 otherwise. 
Following Ayers et al. (2002), CMarg is a continuous variable capturing the 
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percentage of a firm’s common shares outstanding owned by individual investors. To 
calculate this variable, I obtain institutional ownership data from CDA/Spectrum and 
common shares outstanding from Compustat. CDA/Spectrum collects institutions’ 
common stock holdings from their Form 13(f) filings with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). DMarg is an indicator variable coded 1 for firms owned more than 
50 percent by individual investors and 0 otherwise. My two Marg variables are imperfect 
measures of the tax status of a firm’s marginal investor. Institutions such as 
pension/retirement funds and college endowments are exempt from capital gains taxes, 
but not all institutions are tax-exempt organizations. For instance, CDA/Spectrum also 
reports the holdings of banks and other taxable investors. However, as with Ayers et al. 
(2002), noise in these Marg variables works against obtaining my hypothesized results. 
Viewing capital gains taxes as transactions costs associated with the eventual sale 
of a security, I expect that firms whose investors would qualify for long-term capital 
gain tax treatment on disposal of their equity (that is, consistent with the fifth and sixth 
conditions from Shackelford (2000), shares have appreciated in value and investors have 
held them for more than a year) experience lower returns during the event week than 
companies whose investors do not qualify for this preferential tax treatment. Similarly, I 
conjecture that firms whose marginal investors are individuals and would owe capital 
gains taxes upon selling their shares (that is, in keeping with the seventh condition from 
Shackelford (2000), they would benefit from the rate reduction) undergo a less-favorable 
stock price reaction during the event week than companies whose marginal investors are 
institutions. However, for a change in the capital gains tax rate to impact stock prices, 
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these three firm characteristics (appreciated stock price, long-term average holding 
period, and individual marginal investor, respectively) cannot exist in isolation. Rather, 
corporations must possess all three of these traits simultaneously, leading to my second 
hypothesis: 
H2: During the event week (Event=1), firms whose stocks appreciated in value in the 
year preceding the event week, firms with long-term average holding periods, and 
firms with individual marginal investors (DApp•DHP•DMarg=1) experienced 
lower returns than companies lacking one or more of these characteristics 
(DApp•DHP•DMarg=0). 
A negative coefficient for 7 supports this hypothesis. Model (II-2) controls for the 
differential event-week stock return between dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying 
firms documented by Lang and Shackelford (2000) by incorporating their interaction 
term Event•Div. 
I estimate Model (II-2) using only the dichotomous specifications of the variables 
of interest. While I expect that stock return performance during the event week decreases 
with cumulative stock return prior to this week (CApp), holding period length (CHP), 
and the percentage of shares owned by individual investors (CMarg), the difficulty of 
interpreting a four-way interaction term in which three of the components are continuous 
variables (Event•CApp•CHP•CMarg) precludes me from estimating Model (II-2) using 
continuous specifications of these variables. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table II-3 presents descriptive statistics for sample firms in the 
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aggregate as well as partitioned by event and non-event weeks using Event. The average 
weekly raw stock return was 7.925 percent during the event week (n=1515) and 0.377 
percent during the four non-event weeks (n=4•1515=6060). A paired t-test confirms that 
the event-week value is significantly higher than the mean of the non-event-week values. 
The mean equal-weighted market return is also significantly higher in the event week 
than in the non-event weeks, highlighting the importance of including this control 
variable in the models. 
Panels B, C, D, and E of Table II-3 present descriptive statistics for sample firms 
in the aggregate as well as partitioned by dividend policy using DDiv, by stock 
appreciation/depreciation position using DApp, by the length of the average holding 
period using DHP, and by the tax status of the marginal investor using DMarg. Panel B 
shows that approximately 67 percent of the sample firms with complete data (n=1021) 
paid dividends during the 1996 fiscal year. On average, the dividend yield for these 
firms was 2.5 percent. The remaining 33 percent (n=494) comprise the no-dividend 
group. During the event week, the average weekly raw stock return was 5.731 percent 
for dividend-paying firms and 12.458 percent for non-dividend-paying firms. A t-test 
verifies that these average returns are significantly different, preliminary evidence that 
capital gains tax capitalization theory holds for this sample as it did in Lang and 
Shackelford (2000). Additional t-tests in Panel B indicate that dividend paying firms are 
larger, more profitable, more leveraged, and experience greater growth opportunities 
than their non-dividend-paying counterparts. These differences underscore the need to 
control for these firm attributes in the multivariate models.
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Table II-3. Chapter II Descriptive Statistics   
         
Panel A. Event and Non-Event Weeks      
         
  Means   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Total Sample Period  Event Week  Non-Event Weeks  Difference 
Variables  (n=7575)  (Event=1, n=1515)  (Event=0, n=6060)  (2) - (3) 
Ret  1.887  7.925  0.377  7.548* 
EWRet  1.384  4.729  0.547  4.182* 
         
Panel B. Dividend-Paying and Non-Dividend-Paying Firms    
         
  Means   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Total Sample  Dividend-Paying  Non-Dividend-Paying  Difference 
Variable  (n=1515)  (DDiv=1, n=1021)  (DDiv=0, n=494)  (2) - (3) 
Ret  7.925  5.731  12.458  -6.727* 
CDiv  0.017  0.025  0.000  0.025* 
CApp  0.104  0.153  0.002  0.151* 
CHP  14.038  17.756  6.353  11.403 
CMarg  0.552  0.572  0.512  0.060* 
Size  7.492  7.740  6.979  0.761* 
Prof  0.046  0.058  0.021  0.037* 
Lev  1.373  1.770  0.551  1.219* 
Grow  0.323  0.387  0.191  0.196* 
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Table II-3. Continued 
         
Panel C. Firms with Appreciated and Depreciated Stock Positions   
         
  Means   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Total Sample  Appreciated  Depreciated  Difference 
Variable  (n=1515)  (DApp=1, n=1037)  (DApp=0, n=478)  (2) - (3) 
Ret  7.925  6.946  10.048  -3.102* 
CDiv  0.017  0.019  0.012  0.007* 
CApp  0.104  0.277  -0.273  0.551* 
CHP  14.038  8.955  25.065  -16.109 
CMarg  0.552  0.547  0.562  -0.015 
Size  7.492  7.593  7.271  0.322* 
Prof  0.046  0.053  0.030  0.023* 
Lev  1.373  1.674  0.720  0.954* 
Grow  0.323  0.341  0.284  0.057* 
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Table II-3. Continued 
         
Panel D. Firms with Long-Term and Short-Term Average Holding Periods   
         
  Means   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Total Sample  Long-term  Short-term  Difference 
Variable  (n=1515)  (DHP=1, n=1087)  (DHP=0, n=428)  (2) - (3) 
Ret  7.925  6.051  12.683  -6.632* 
CDiv  0.017  0.022  0.005  0.018* 
CApp  0.104  0.139  0.014  0.125* 
CHP  14.038  19.342  0.567  18.774* 
CMarg  0.552  0.607  0.414  0.193* 
Size  7.492  7.612  7.186  0.426* 
Prof  0.046  0.054  0.027  0.027* 
Lev  1.373  1.627  0.727  0.900* 
Grow  0.323  0.341  0.279  0.062* 
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Table II-3. Continued 
         
Panel E. Firms with Individual and Institutional Marginal Investors   
         
  Means   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Total Sample  Individual  Institutional  Difference 
Variable  (n=1515)  (DMarg=1, n=802)  (DMarg=0, n=713)  (2) - (3) 
Ret  7.925  7.042  8.917  -1.875* 
CDiv  0.017  0.021  0.013  0.008* 
CApp  0.104  0.089  0.120  -0.031 
CHP  14.038  25.198  1.485  23.713* 
CMarg  0.552  0.749  0.331  0.418* 
Size  7.492  7.416  7.577  -0.161* 
Prof  0.046  0.046  0.046  0.000 
Lev  1.373  1.616  1.100  0.516* 
Grow  0.323  0.339  0.306  0.033* 
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Table II-3. Continued 
         
Panel F. Firms with DApp•DHP•DMarg=1 and DApp•DHP•DMarg=0   
         
  Means   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Total Sample  DApp•DHP•DMarg=1  DApp•DHP•DMarg=0  Difference 
Variable  (n=1515)  (n=483)  (n=1032)  (2) - (3) 
Ret  7.925  5.325  9.141  -3.816* 
CDiv  0.017  0.027  0.013  0.014* 
CApp  0.104  0.267  0.027  0.239* 
CHP  14.038  17.525  12.406  5.119 
CMarg  0.552  0.758  0.456  0.302* 
Size  7.492  7.603  7.440  0.163* 
Prof  0.046  0.060  0.039  0.021* 
Lev  1.373  2.124  1.021  1.103* 
Grow  0.323  0.387  0.293  0.093* 
         
* The difference in means is significant at the 0.05 level.     
         
I calculate these means during the event week (from 4/29/97 to 5/5/97).     
 
  
28 
2
8
 
Panel C displays that approximately 68 percent of the sample firms with 
complete data (n=1037) experienced stock price appreciation during the year preceding 
April 28, 1997. The average stock price appreciation for these firms was 27.7 percent. 
The mean share price depreciation for remaining companies (n=478) was 27.3 percent. 
During the event week, the average weekly raw stock return was 6.946 percent for 
appreciated firms and 10.048 percent for depreciated firms. Panel D demonstrates that 
roughly 72 percent of sample companies (n=1087) had long-term average holding 
periods, and the average event week return for this sub-sample was 6.051 percent. In 
contrast, the other 28 percent of the sample (n=428) reported short-term average holding 
periods and an average return of 12.683 percent during the event week.
16
 Panel E shows 
that approximately 53 percent of the sample firms (n=802) had individual marginal 
investors whereas the remaining 47 percent (n=713) were majority owned by 
institutions. During the event week, the average weekly raw stock return was 7.042 
percent for individual-owned firms and 8.917 percent for institution-owned firms. T-
tests reveal that the differences between the mean returns in Panels C, D, and E are 
significant, evidence that market reaction to the TRA97 rate cut announcement varied 
with the tax characteristics of the marginal investor. 
Panel F partitions the total sample of 1,515 firms into sub-samples of firms with 
appreciated stock positions, long-term average holding periods, and individual marginal 
investors (DApp•DHP•DMarg=1) and corporations lacking one or more of these traits 
(DApp•DHP•DMarg=0). For the 32 percent of sample firms possessing all three of these 
characteristics (n=483), the average event week return was 5.325 percent. For the 68 
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percent (n=1032) missing at least one of the characteristics, the mean return was 9.141 
percent. These mean returns differ significantly, supporting H2. 
To determine if these descriptive statistics are sensitive to the sample partitions 
on the variables of interest used in Table II-3, I divide the overall sample of 1,515 firms 
into quartiles based on CDiv, CApp, CHP, and CMarg, respectively.
17
 Panel A of Table 
II-4 shows that mean raw returns during the event week fall monotonically as dividend 
yield increases, share price appreciates, average holding period lengthens, and 
percentage of individual investor ownership rises.
18
 The only exception is the mean 
return for CApp in the fourth quartile, which is still lower than the mean return in the 
first quartile. Panel B demonstrates that this same pattern holds for median raw returns 
also. 
Before proceeding with regression analyses, I examine the Pearson and 
Spearman correlations among the response and explanatory variables in the models. 
Table II-5 presents these correlation matrices. As expected, several of the explanatory 
variables are highly correlated with the response variable, Ret. Panel A of Table II-5 
displays that the parametric and nonparametric correlations between Ret and Event are 
both positive and significant at the 0.01 level, evidence that news of the TRA97 capital 
gains tax rate cut conveyed good news to the market. Panels B and C verify that 
dividend-paying firms, firms with appreciated stock positions, firms with long-term 
average holding periods, and firms with individual marginal investors are significantly, 
negatively correlated with raw returns during the event week. Many of the explanatory 
variables are also highly correlated with one another, emphasizing the importance of 
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Table II-4. Average Event-Week Raw Returns by Quartile  
         
Panel A. Mean Returns       
         
  Quartile 
Variable  1  2  3  4 
CDiv  7.406  5.570  5.354  4.595 
CApp  10.973  6.637  6.068  8.028 
CHP  13.224  7.109  6.338  5.042 
CMarg  9.253  8.558  7.567  6.324 
         
Panel B. Median Returns      
         
  Quartile 
Variable  1  2  3  4 
CDiv  6.326  5.594  5.282  4.297 
CApp  8.464  5.642  5.110  6.373 
CHP  11.615  6.078  5.642  4.304 
CMarg  6.962  6.562  6.259  4.617 
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Table II-5. Chapter II Correlation Matrices         
             
Panel A. Correlations between Ret and Event       
             
  Variable         
Variable  Ret  Event         
Ret    0.4206***         
Event  0.4514***           
             
Panel B. Correlations among Ret and Dichotomous Explanatory Variables       
             
  Variable 
Variable  Ret  DDiv  DApp  DHP  DMarg  DApp•DHP•DMarg 
Ret    -0.3859**  -0.1764**  -0.3654**  -0.1145**  -0.2176*** 
DDiv  -0.3291***    0.2307***  0.4580***  0.0974***  0.2795*** 
DApp  -0.1485***  0.2307***    0.1829***  -0.0283  0.4645*** 
DHP  -0.3251***  0.4580***  0.1829***    0.2925***  0.4293*** 
DMarg  -0.1274***  0.0974***  -0.0283  0.2925***    0.6451*** 
DApp•DHP•DMarg  -0.2285***  0.2795***  0.4645***  0.4293***  0.6451***   
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Table II-5. Continued       
           
Panel C. Correlations among Ret and Continuous Explanatory Variables     
           
  Variable 
Variable  Ret  CDiv  CApp  CHP  CMarg 
Ret    -0.2339***  -0.1683***  -0.0220  -0.1609** 
CDiv  -0.3567***    0.0871***  -0.0148  0.1854*** 
CApp  -0.0911***  0.1521***    -0.0212  -0.0390 
CHP  -0.3541***  0.4444***  0.1162***    0.1377*** 
CMarg  -0.1796***  0.1777***  -0.0451*  0.57907***   
           
*** The coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level.       
** The coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level.       
* The coefficient is significant at the 0.1 level.        
           
Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients appear above and below the diagonals, respectively. 
I calculate these correlations during the event week (from 4/29/97 to 5/5/97). 
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examining multicollinearity in multivariate analyses. 
Regression Results 
Table II-6 presents the results of estimating Model (II-1). The F-statistics 
(untabulated) for all models in Table II-6 are highly significant (p<0.0001), indicating 
that the overall models are valuable for predicting weekly raw stock returns. The 
explanatory power of Model (II-1), as measured by adjusted R
2
, is approximately 22 
percent when the model includes DDiv and around 19 percent when it includes CDiv. 
Consistent with my expectation, the coefficient 1 on Event is positive and significant 
regardless of the specification of Div. Also, consistent with Lang and Shackelford 
(2000), the coefficient 3 on the interaction term Event•Div is negative and significant, 
lending strong support to H1; for my sample of firms, non-dividend-paying companies 
outperformed dividend-paying companies during the event week. This result also obtains 
when the control variables Size, Prof, Lev, and Grow appear in the model. Inferences are 
unaffected when I add industry indicator variables based on two-digit SIC codes 
(untabulated). 
Table II-7 presents the results of estimating Model (II-2). As in Model (II-1), the 
F-statistics for both models in Table II-7 are highly significant (p<0.0001). The 
explanatory power of Model (II-2), gauged by adjusted R
2
, is approximately 22 percent 
regardless of whether control variables are included or omitted. Consistent with H2, the 
coefficient 7 on the interaction term Event•App•HP•Marg is negative and significant. 
Thus, firms possessing all three of the testable characteristics from Shackelford (2000) 
(appreciated stock price, long-term average holding period, and individual marginal 
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Table II-6. Model (II-1) Coefficient Estimates     
Retjt = 0 + 1 Eventt + 2 Divj + 3 Eventt • Divj + k X + jt   
           
    Dichotomous Div Variable  Continuous Div Variable 
Variable  Pred.  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 
Intercept    -0.527***  -1.587***  -0.036  -0.639 
Event  (+)  10.853***  10.853***  7.085***  7.086*** 
Div    0.975***  0.841***  9.709***  10.018*** 
Event•Div  (-)  -7.702***  -7.702***  -83.090**  -83.091** 
EWRet    0.451***  0.451***  0.451***  0.451*** 
Size      0.153**    0.091 
Prof      0.809    0.003 
Lev      0.023    0.014 
Grow      -0.209    -0.326 
Adjusted R
2
    0.221  0.221  0.194  0.194 
           
*** The coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level.     
** The coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level.     
* The coefficient is significant at the 0.1 level.     
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Table II-7. Model (II-2) Coefficient Estimates     
Retjt = 0 + 1 Eventt + 2 Divj + 3 Appj + 4 HPj + 5 Margj + 6 Eventt • Divj + 
            7 Eventt • Appj • HPj • Margj + k X + jt     
         
    Dichotomous Variables   
Variable  Pred.  Coefficient  Coefficient   
Intercept    -0.653***  -1.628***   
Event  (+)  11.140***  11.141***   
Div    0.947***  0.837***   
App    0.354**  0.307**   
HP    -0.111  -0.160   
Marg    -0.035  0.003   
Event•Div  (-)  -7.097***  -7.095***   
Event•App•HP•Marg  (-)  -2.180***  -2.189***   
EWRet    0.451***  0.451***   
Size      0.144**   
Prof      0.939   
Lev      0.027   
Grow      -0.206   
Adjusted R
2
    0.224  0.225   
         
*** The coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level.     
** The coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level.     
* The coefficient is significant at the 0.1 level.     
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investor) underperformed firms lacking one or more of these traits during the event 
week. Also note that the coefficient 6 on the interaction term Event•Div remains 
significantly negative. As in Model (II-1), incorporating control and industry indicator 
variables into Model (II-2) does not alter these results. 
Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients from Table II-5 reveal that, during 
the event week, the variables Div, App, HP, and Marg, as well as the interaction term 
App•HP•Marg, are highly correlated. Thus, I examine each explanatory variable’s 
variance inflation factor (VIF) to determine how much of that variable’s variation is 
explained by the other predictors in the models and ultimately if multicollinearity 
impacts the regression results. With the exception of certain industry indicators, no 
variable’s VIF in any model is larger than 10, implying that multicollinearity is not a 
severe problem.
19
 
To gauge the economic significance of the regression results, I examine the 
estimated coefficients from Model (II-2) in Table II-7. When the model includes control 
variables (Size, Prof, Lev, and Grow), the average raw return in the event week is 11.141 
percent (the coefficient 1) greater than the average raw return in non-event weeks for 
non-dividend-paying firms that have depreciated stock positions, short-term average 
holding periods, and institutional marginal investors. For dividend-paying firms, this 
difference in returns between event and non-event weeks drops by 6.258 percent (the 
sum of the coefficients 2 and 6) to 4.883 percent. An F-test confirms that the sum of 
these two coefficients is significantly less than zero (p<0.0001). For firms possessing all 
three of the testable characteristics from Shackelford (2000) (appreciated stock positions, 
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long-term average holding periods, and individual marginal investors), this difference in 
returns falls by 2.039 percent (the sum of the coefficients 3, 4, 5, and 7) to 9.102 
percent. An F-test verifies that the sum of these four coefficients is significantly less than 
zero (p<0.0001). 
Three key results emerge from the descriptive statistics presented in Tables II-3, 
II-4, and II-5 and the regression results provided in Tables II-6 and II-7. First, sample 
firms experienced substantially larger returns during the event week than during the four 
non-event weeks, indicating that the announcement of the TRA97 capital gains tax rate 
reduction represented positive news for the market as a whole. Second, non-dividend-
paying firms outperformed dividend-paying firms during the event week, and this result 
from Lang and Shackelford (2000) persists regardless of the other variables included in 
the model. Third, controlling for this dividend yield effect, firms with appreciated stock 
positions, average holding periods of at least one year, and individual marginal investors 
reported lower event-week returns than companies lacking one or more of these 
characteristics. While this sub-sample of firms earned significant, positive returns, 
implying that anticipation of a lessening of the lock-in effect did not subsume the good 
news inherent in the tax rate cut, the underperformance of these companies relative to 
the remainder of the sample is significant, both statistically and economically. 
I subject my results to a battery of sensitivity analyses to determine if the 
findings are attributable to particular sample, model, and variable specifications. First, 
Liang et al. (2000) criticize Lang and Shackelford (2000) for examining only large firms, 
implying that incorporating smaller companies into the sample may alter conclusions. 
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Since the descriptive statistics and regression results presented previously obtain from a 
sample of 1,515 large firms (mean market value of $1,793 million), I address this 
potential criticism by examining as my sample all firms with complete data in the 
Compustat, CRSP, and CDA/Spectrum databases; this full sample contains 4,293 firms 
(mean market value of $200 million). Second, I re-estimate all models using the value-
weighted rather than the equal-weighted weekly return of the relevant market index as a 
control variable. Third, I re-measure the dichotomous and continuous App variables by 
terminating the accumulation period on April 14, 1997. Fourth, I also cumulate returns 
for these App variables over 18- and 6-month time horizons (both ending on April 28, 
1997) in addition to the 12-month horizon detailed previously. Fifth, I incorporate the 
suggestion of Phillips (2002) from his discussion of Liang et al. (2002) by re-coding the 
CHP variable as the log of each firm’s inverse share turnover ratio rather than the raw 
ratio. Sixth, I re-partition the DHP variable at the median CHP value of 1.675 rather than 
1.0; that is, I re-code a firm’s DHP variable as 1 if that company’s CHP value exceeds 
the median and 0 otherwise. Finally, I again re-estimate all descriptive statistics and 
models after winsorizing Ret, CDiv, CApp, CHP, and CMarg at both the 99
th
/1
st
 and the 
95
th
/5
th
 percentiles. The results of these sensitivity analyses (untabulated) are 
qualitatively equivalent to those reported in Tables 3-7, indicating that my conclusions 
are not attributable to firm size, market return measure, appreciation/depreciation time 
horizon, holding period variable specification, or influential observations. 
Comparison with Contemporaneous Research 
Dai et al. (2006) also examine stock price reaction to the TRA97 capital gains tax 
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rate reduction. The authors predict that “the capitalization effect (price increase caused 
by demand shift upward) will be stronger than the lock-in effect before the tax cut 
becomes effective and the lock-in effect (price decrease caused by supply shift 
downward) will dominate the capitalization effect after the tax rate cut effective date” 
(p. 5). They report that the capitalization effect is stronger in the week preceding the rate 
cut (the announcement week: April 30 to May 6, 1997) for non-dividend-paying firms 
(consistent with Lang and Shackelford 2000) and that the lock-in effect is stronger in the 
week succeeding the rate cut (the effective date week: May 7 to 13, 1997) for firms with 
appreciated stock price positions and high levels of institutional ownership. 
Using my sample of 1,515 firms, I examine stock price reaction during the 
effective date week in addition to the announcement week. Specifically, I estimate full 
and reduced forms of the following model: 
Retjt = 0 + 1 Annt + 2 Efft + 3 Divj + 4 Appj + 5 HPj + 6 Margj + 7 Annt • Divj + 
8 Annt • Appj • HPj • Margj + 9 Efft • Divj + 10 Efft • Appj • HPj • Margj + k X + jt (II-3) 
where 
Retjt = raw stock return for sample firm j in week t (t includes six weeks from 
4/15/97 to 5/28/97)
20
 
Annt = an indicator variable coded 1 if week t is 4/29/97 to 5/5/97 (announcement 
week) and 0 otherwise (excluding the effective date week) 
Efft = an indicator variable coded 1 if week t is 5/7/97 to 5/13/97 (effective date 
week) and 0 otherwise (excluding the announcement week) 
All other variables in this model are operationalized in the same manner as those in 
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Models (II-1) and (II-2). 
Table II-8 displays the results of estimating Model (II-3). When I estimate Model 
(II-2) in Table II-7, I use the effective date week as a control week. In the first column of 
Table II-8, I essentially replicate my estimation of Model (II-2) in Table II-7, but I no 
longer use the effective date week as a control week. As in Model (II-2), the coefficient 
1 on Ann is positive and significant, and the coefficients 7 and 8 on the interaction 
terms Ann•Div and Ann•App•HP•Marg are both negative and significant. Thus, the 
change in non-event weeks does not alter my findings. In the second column, I examine 
stock price reaction during the effective date week. The coefficient 9 on the interaction 
term Eff•Div is negative and significant, indicating that non-dividend-paying firms 
continue to outperform dividend-paying companies during the effective date week as 
they did during the announcement week. In contrast to the findings of Dai et al. (2006), 
the coefficient 10 on the interaction term Eff•App•HP•Marg is insignificant, implying 
that the lock-in effect does not dominate during the effective date week for my sample of 
firms with appreciated stock positions, long-term average holding periods, and 
individual marginal investors.
21
 Also note that the explanatory power of the model in the 
second column (2.1 percent) is much lower than that of the model in the first column 
(22.5 percent). In the third column, I estimate the full form of Model (II-3), which 
gauges stock price reaction during both the announcement and effective date weeks. 
None of the inferences from the first two columns of Table II-8 change; that is, non-
dividend-paying firms experience significantly higher returns in both weeks, and firms 
possessing the three testable conditions from Shackelford (2000) experience 
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Table II-8. Model (II-3) Coefficient Estimates      
Retjt = 0 + 1 Annt + 2 Efft + 3 Divj + 4 Appj + 5 HPj + 6 Margj +   
            7 Annt • Divj + 8 Annt • Appj • HPj • Margj + 9 Efft • Divj +    
            10 Efft • Appj • HPj • Margj + k X + jt      
          
    Dichotomous Variables  
Variable  Pred.  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  
Intercept    -0.252  -0.719  -0.367  
Ann  (+)  8.630***    8.626***  
Eff      0.062  0.039  
Div    0.446**  0.098  0.457**  
App    0.423***  0.318**  0.178  
HP    -0.714***  0.067  -0.590***  
Marg    -0.205  -0.298**  -0.141  
Ann•Div  (-)  -6.476***    -6.483***  
Ann•App•HP•Marg  (-)  -1.903***    -1.874***  
Eff•Div      -0.799**  -0.849**  
Eff•App•HP•Marg      -0.022  0.154  
EWRet    0.852***  0.851***  0.851***  
Size    0.072  0.103*  0.098*  
Prof    3.406**  1.379  1.432  
Lev    -0.009  0.021  0.004  
Grow    -0.511**  -0.245  -0.403*  
Adjusted R
2
    0.225  0.021  0.203  
          
*** The coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level.      
** The coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level.      
* The coefficient is significant at the 0.1 level.      
          
Ret = weekly stock return for the six trading weeks from 4/15/97 to 5/28/97   
Ann = 1 if the trading week is 4/29/97 to 5/5/97 and 0 otherwise (excluding 5/7/97 to 5/13/97) 
Eff = 1 if the trading week is 5/7/97 to 5/13/97 and 0 otherwise (excluding 4/29/97 to 5/5/97) 
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significantly lower returns than other companies during the announcement week but not 
during the effective date week. 
Dai et al. (2006) offer two explanations for why evidence of the lock-in effect 
may not emerge during the effective date week. First, investors can dispose of their 
securities at any point during the time period that the new tax rate applies to these 
dispositions. Thus, benefiting from this rate reduction does not mandate immediate sales 
of these assets during the effective date week. Second, if investors dispose of their stock 
during the effective date week, they may reinvest the proceeds from these sales in other 
securities, yielding an insignificant stock price reaction to the rate cut for the market as a 
whole. The evidence that I present in Table II-8 supports a third rationale. Specifically, I 
propose that, when investors learned of the impending capital gains tax rate reduction 
during the announcement week, those stockholders who would benefit from the new 
lower rate (that is, individuals with accrued capital gains and long-term holding periods) 
revalued their equity holdings in accordance with the news. Since these investors would 
accept a lower pre-tax price for their shares at some point in the future in order to receive 
the same after-tax profit, firms that were owned by these investors experienced lower 
returns during the announcement week than other companies. This explanation, in 
conjunction with the two suggested by Dai et al., is consistent with a negative stock price 
reaction during the announcement week followed by a muted response during the 
effective date week for firms possessing the three required conditions from Shackelford 
(2000). 
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Conclusion and Future Research 
This study provides evidence consistent with capital gains taxes significantly 
impacting stock prices during a one-week time period when news of an anticipated 
reduction in the capital gains tax rate reached investors. The first set of regression 
analyses (presented in Table II-6) demonstrates that the share prices of firms not 
currently paying dividends increased more during the event week than the share prices of 
dividend-paying companies. This result is consistent with capital gains tax capitalization 
theory and documents an efficient market response to news of an expected tax cut. 
Theory dictates that seven conditions must hold for a change in the capital gains 
tax rate to influence equity prices. Prior research investigating the impact of a capital 
gains tax rate change on security values has assumed implicitly that these seven 
conditions occur without explicitly examining them. I contribute to this stream of tax 
research by testing three of these requirements empirically. My second set of regression 
results (presented in Table II-7) documents that the TRA97 rate cut influenced equity 
values differently depending on investors’ tax attributes. Specifically, firms whose 
investors would benefit from the capital gains tax rate reduction upon eventual sale of 
their stock underperformed companies whose shareholders were ambivalent to this tax 
cut. That is, firms with appreciated stock positions, average holding periods of at least 
one year, and individual marginal investors reported lower returns during the week when 
news of the TRA97 capital gains rate cut reached the market than companies with 
depreciated stock positions, average holding periods of less than one year, or 
institutional marginal investors. 
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One limitation of this study is the error inherent in measuring the App and HP 
variables. Cumulating returns to capture stock price appreciation/depreciation and 
calculating the inverse share turnover ratio to estimate holding period length are 
accepted proxies in the capital gains tax capitalization literature. However, any 
inaccuracy in calculating the marginal investor’s holding period yields measurement 
error in both the App and HP variables. One method to reduce this measurement error 
(and an avenue for future research) is to examine the stock price reaction of recent initial 
public offering (IPO) firms. Blouin et al. (2002) employ this approach to gauge trading 
volume and stock price reactions to news of the repeal of the 18-month holding period 
rule, a provision of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998. While this technique 
would reduce sample size (and the associated power of statistical tests) and limit the 
generality of results, IPOs provide a clean starting date for measuring stock price 
appreciation/depreciation and holding period length. 
Calculating the percentages of a firm’s shares held by individual and institutional 
investors, respectively, is one method for capturing the tax status of that company’s 
marginal investor. Alternate approaches exist. For example, the TRA97 capital gains tax 
rate cut affected only investors subject to US Federal income taxation. Thus, measuring 
the proportions of a corporation’s outstanding equity owned by domestic and foreign 
shareholders, respectively, is also a viable proxy for the marginal investor’s tax status. 
Lower returns during the event week for firms owned primarily by domestic 
stockholders (relative to companies with foreign marginal investors) would provide 
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additional evidence of investors anticipating an attenuation of the lock-in effect in 
response to the capital gains tax rate reduction announcement. 
Notes 
1. Ayers et al. (2003) also measure the marginal investor’s tax status and search for 
evidence of the lock-in effect. However, these authors examine the impact of 
shareholder-level capital gains taxes in a different context. Specifically, they 
“model acquisition premiums as a function of proxies for the capital gains taxes of 
target shareholders, taxability of the acquisition, and tax status of the price-setting 
shareholder as represented by the level of target institutional ownership” (p. 2783). 
2.
 
Harris and Kemsley (1999) formulate a residual-income model to demonstrate how 
dividend taxes influence the comparative valuation of retained earnings, 
contributed equity, and expected future earnings. The authors conclude that 
dividend taxes lower the value of expected future earnings and that overall firm 
value is inversely related to the dividend tax rate. Thus, their findings indicate that 
stock prices impound dividend taxes. Harris and Kemsley assume that stockholders 
receive all firm earnings as dividends, disallowing the possibility that capital gains 
taxes impact equity values. 
Collins and Kemsley (2000) extend the work of Harris and Kemsley (1999) 
by incorporating capital gains taxes into the residual-income model. The authors 
draw three conclusions. First, both dividend and capital gains taxes lower 
stockholders’ valuation of the retained portion of current profits. Second, dividend 
taxes (but not capital gains taxes) lower the valuation of the portion of current 
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profits that shareholders receive as dividends. Third, dividend taxes (but not capital 
gains taxes) lower the valuation of retained earnings. Although the first two results 
are intuitive, the third merits additional discussion. When investors purchase shares 
of stock, they implicitly pay for firms’ accumulated equity. Thus, each 
shareholder’s tax basis in his stock precludes him from paying capital gains taxes 
on this accumulated equity upon eventual sale of the stock. However, if the 
corporation distributes these accumulated profits as dividends, the shareholder 
owes taxes on this income. These results suggest that stockholders capitalize both 
dividend and capital gains taxes into stock price and that raising these tax rates 
decreases equity values. 
The use of residual-income modeling to determine the effect of investor taxes 
on firm market value has generated disagreement among academics. Hanlon et al. 
(2003) state, “While the Ohlson model might be appropriate for analyzing the 
relation between prices and fundamental accounting variables under the null 
hypothesis of no dividend taxation, it is not clear that the model is appropriate for 
analyzing the alternative hypothesis that investors discount retained earnings by 
their marginal tax rate” (p. 121). Dhaliwal et al. (2003) also question the 
methodologies and findings of Harris and Kemsley (1999) and Collins and 
Kemsley (2000), concluding that the residual-income models used in these studies 
are flawed and that the related findings are unreliable. My study does not address 
this controversy. 
3.
 
Using panel data collected from a large sample of high-income individual 
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taxpayers, Auerbach et al. (1998) find that the effective tax rate on realized capital 
gains is near the statutory rate for all tax brackets in all sample years. The authors 
conclude that capital gains tax evasion is rare. Landsman et al. (2002) examine the 
determinants of capital gains tax compliance related to the 1989 RJR Nabisco 
leveraged buyout by linking confidential individual tax returns provided by the IRS 
with confidential shareholder records provided by RJR Nabisco. They find that 
compliance decreases as income increases and that, on average, taxpayers in their 
unique sample failed to report 11 percent of total gains. 
4. Liang et al. (2002) also borrow this measure from Guenther (2000). 
5. A firm’s shareholders can realize capital gains on the sale of their stock only if the 
firm does not immediately distribute all of its earnings to these shareholders in the 
form of dividends. Thus, the higher a firm’s dividend payout, the lower the benefit 
that shareholders receive from a reduction in the capital gains tax rate. If the firm 
retains a portion of profits rather than distributing this income to shareholders as 
dividends, capital gains tax capitalization theory dictates that a decrease in the 
capital gains tax rate increases the firm’s stock price and that the rise in the stock 
price increases with the level of retained earnings. 
6.
 
Lang and Shackelford (2000) use the 2,000 largest US corporations reported by 
Datastream as their initial sample and conduct their analyses on the 1,975 firms 
with complete data. For comparability, I select the 2,500 largest US firms based on 
Compustat market value as my initial sample. Liang et al. (2002) suggest that the 
results from Lang and Shackelford (2000) may not extend to smaller firms. I 
  
48 
4
8
 
address this concern by re-estimating regression models using all firms with 
complete data as my sample, regardless of market value. 
7. Guenther (2000) uses a slightly different event week: the five trading days from 
May 1 to 7, 1997. 
8.
 According to Lang and Shackelford (2000), “A casual review of the business press 
during that [event] week reveals no particularly newsworthy events” (p. 83). Thus, 
large stock price movements during the event week are likely attributable to the 
announcement of the TRA97 capital gains tax rate cut rather than other news 
reaching the market simultaneously. 
9. Specifically, Lang and Shackelford (2000) include Size, Prof, and Lev; Liang et al. 
(2002) use Size, Lev, and Grow; and Ayers et al. (2002) incorporate Size, Prof, 
Lev, and Grow. 
10.
 
In a sensitivity analysis, I include the value-weighted (rather than the equal-
weighted) weekly return as a control variable. 
11.
 
As I explain in a subsequent section of the paper, I use only the dichotomous 
specifications of these variables when estimating Model (II-2). I use the continuous 
specifications when calculating certain descriptive statistics. 
12. As investors revalued stocks in their portfolios upon learning of the impending 
TRA97 rate cut during the event week (from April 29 to May 5, 1997), they would 
have considered those securities’ appreciation/depreciation from the date of 
acquisition until the date that they learned of the news. Thus, to accurately gauge 
the differential stock price reaction during the event week for firms with 
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appreciated and depreciated stock positions, the accumulation period for my App 
variables should end on April 28, 1997. Applying the same logic, Liang et al. 
(2002) also terminate their accumulation window immediately before the event 
week. However, this window overlaps with the non-event weeks during which I 
calculate the response variable Ret, which begin on April 15, 1997. In a sensitivity 
analysis, I conclude the accumulation period on April 14, 1997 to avoid this 
intersection. 
13.
 
In addition to measuring DApp and CApp over a 12-month period, I also calculate 
these variables over 6- and 18-month windows, both ending on April 28, 1997. 
14.
 
In his discussion of Liang et al. (2002), Phillips (2002) suggests calculating the 
natural logarithm of CHP rather than using the raw ratio. I examine this alternate 
variable specification in a sensitivity analysis. 
15. Asserting that a CHP value of 1.0 implies an average holding period of exactly one 
year imposes certain assumptions on the data: First, all of the sample firms’ 
common shares outstanding must be available for trade. Second, since I measure 
common shares outstanding at December 31, 1996, this number of shares must 
remain outstanding throughout the year; that is, sample companies neither issued 
nor repurchased shares during 1996. Third, holding period length is homogeneous 
across each firm’s shareholders; that is, each share turns over identically to all 
other shares. While these simplifying assumptions may be implausible, the purpose 
of partitioning this variable at 1.0 is to facilitate the calculation of descriptive 
statistics and the estimation of Model (II-2) using DHP as an explanatory variable. 
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In a sensitivity test, I explore whether the results presented in Tables II-3, II-5, and 
II-7 differ if I dichotomize the variable at its median value of 1.675 rather than 1.0. 
16. Liang et al. (2002) also find a significantly negative relation between returns and 
holding period length during the event week and assert that “…the present value of 
the tax benefits associated with the capital gains tax rate reduction is greater for 
firms with lower average holding periods” (p. 54). While I agree with their 
interpretation of this result, I proffer that a complementary (and perhaps more 
fundamental) explanation is that, as holding period length decreases, the likelihood 
that firms’ marginal investors have held their securities for greater than one year 
also falls. Given that news of the TRA97 rate cut should affect only stock prices of 
firms exhibiting the required conditions from Shackelford (2000), investor 
anticipation of a lessening of the lock-in effect during the event week should apply 
only to companies with long-term average holding periods. 
17.
 
When partitioning the sample into quartiles based on CDiv, I remove non-
dividend-paying firms. 
18.
 
To ensure that extreme values do not drive the results, I winsorize Ret at both the 
99
th
/1
st
 and the 95
th
/5
th
 percentiles. The pattern in Table II-5 is qualitatively 
unaltered by this sensitivity test. 
19.
 
As an alternate multicollinearity diagnostic test, I also construct condition indices 
using the procedure from Belsley et al. (1980) for each model. No model has a 
condition index greater than 30, additional evidence that linear dependencies 
among explanatory variables do not influence the multivariate results. 
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20.
 
All six weeks contain five trading days. The last of these six weeks extends to May 
28, 1997 because markets were closed on May 26, 1997 for the Memorial Day 
holiday. May 6, 1997 falls between the announcement and effective date weeks 
and is excluded from this analysis. 
21. I do not attempt to precisely replicate the primary model (eq. 12, p. 16) from Dai et 
al. (2006) and thus do not refute the results that these authors report. Rather, I 
attribute the differences between our findings to differences between our empirical 
methodologies. For example, Dai et al. use a different time period to control for 
returns during non-event weeks, measure stock price appreciation/depreciation 
over a different time horizon, and do not incorporate average holding period length 
into their study (and thus do not investigate the sixth required condition from 
Shackelford 2000). 
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CHAPTER III 
 
PARTIAL ADJUSTMENT TOWARD TARGET CAPITAL STRUCTURES: 
 
DO TAXES MATTER? 
 
 
Introduction 
A long stream of corporate finance research has examined the determinants of 
firms‟ capital structures. Four primary theories have emerged. Myers (1984) proposes 
that firms follow a pecking order in their financing decisions, funding operations first 
with internally generated cash. If internal financing is insufficient, companies next issue 
debt; they sell new stock as a last resort. Baker and Wurgler (2002) develop a model in 
which firms issue stock when current market valuations of equity are high; therefore, 
companies‟ capital structures result from their attempts to time the market. Inertia theory 
from Welch (2004) holds that firms‟ capital structures vary as their stock prices fluctuate 
and that companies do not take steps to counteract these distortions. One common 
characteristic of the pecking order, market timing, and inertia theories is that firms do 
not establish target leverage ratios and thus do not revert to these targets following 
shocks. In contrast, the tradeoff theory of capital structure holds that companies 
determine optimal capital structures by weighing the costs and benefits of debt financing 
and that firms‟ convergence to these targets depends on various adjustments costs. 
Recent studies have tested these capital structure theories empirically. Frank and 
Goyal (2003) and Fama and French (2005) find that firms issue equity far more often 
and under different circumstances than the pecking order theory predicts. Similarly, 
Leary and Roberts (2005) and Liu (2005) discover that the market timing and inertia 
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theories do not accurately characterize empirical evidence. These studies conclude that a 
dynamic tradeoff model in which firms establish target capital structures and adjustment 
costs dictate the speed at which they approach these optimal levels fits the data best. 
Researchers have also considered the role that taxes play in the determination of 
corporations‟ capital structures. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) demonstrate that firms 
substitute non-debt tax shields such as depreciation deductions and investment tax 
credits for the interest deductions associated with debt, thereby reducing companies‟ 
leverage ratios. MacKie-Mason (1990) and Trezevant (1992) find that non-debt tax 
shields only effectively substitute for debt in firms‟ capital structures if those shields 
reduce companies‟ marginal tax rates. Manzon (1994) discovers that companies retire 
debt early to reduce their leverage ratios when their debt levels exceed their targets. 
If taxes affect firms‟ capital structures as prior research has shown then, by 
logical extension, taxes may also influence how rapidly companies adjust to their target 
capital structures. The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether taxes serve as 
adjustment costs that influence the speed at which firms converge on their target 
leverage ratios. Specifically, I hypothesize that, among high-tax firms, companies below 
their optimal debt levels respond more quickly than companies above these targets 
because high-tax firms can better utilize the interest deductions generated by issuing 
additional debt to reduce their tax liabilities. Conversely, I expect that, among low-tax 
firms, companies above their target capital structures adjust more rapidly than 
companies below their goals because low-tax firms have less need of interest deductions 
to decrease their tax burdens and thus sacrifice less tax benefit when retiring debt. 
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To test these predictions, I use the partial-adjustment model from Flannery and 
Rangan (2006). Using a sample of 3,736 firm-year observations from years 1981-2000, I 
begin by replicating the model to verify that the explanatory variables impact firms‟ 
market debt ratios as prior research has discovered. Then, I employ this methodology to 
determine if firms‟ tax statuses (high or low) have a differing impact on the speeds at 
which they converge on their target leverage ratios depending on whether they are 
currently above or below these optimal levels. I find that, among low-tax firms, 
companies with actual debt ratios above their targets adjust more rapidly. This result is 
consistent with low-tax firms having a greater willingness to retire debt because of an 
inability to benefit from interest deductions. Among high-tax firms, companies with 
actual debt ratios below their targets adjust more quickly. This finding indicates that 
high-tax firms are better able to utilize the interest deductions associated with new debt 
issues to reduce their tax liabilities. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The second section reviews 
prior theoretical and empirical research examining the determinants of firms‟ capital 
structures. The third section details my hypotheses, the methodology that I use to test 
these hypotheses, and my sample selection criteria. The fourth section presents 
descriptive statistics for my sample and the results of my regression analyses. The fifth 
section reports separate results for debt and equity adjusters. Finally, the sixth section 
concludes. 
Previous Research 
Myers (1984) coined the term “pecking order” to describe firms‟ preferred 
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sequencing of financing choices for corporate operations. He traces the roots of the 
pecking order theory to Donaldson (1961), who writes that, “Management strongly 
favored internal generation as a source of new funds even to the exclusion of external 
funds except for occasional unavoidable „bulges‟ in the need for funds” (p. 67). 
Specifically, pecking order theory contends that firms finance corporate operations first 
with internally generated funds because the use of cash reserves avoids the 
administrative and underwriting costs associated with debt and equity issues as well as 
the potential under-pricing of these new securities. If firms exhaust their internal funds 
and thus require external financing, they issue securities according to risk. That is, firms 
first issue debt, then hybrid securities such as mandatorily redeemable preferred stock or 
convertible bonds, and finally equity. Myers (1984) cites available empirical evidence 
supporting these pecking order predictions: According to Brealey and Myers (1984), 
firms financed 62 percent of capital expenditures with internal funds during the decade 
from 1973-1982, and new stock issues constituted six percent or less of total external 
financing during this period (Table 14-3, p. 291). Pecking order theory implies that firms 
do not establish target leverage ratios. Rather, capital structures reflect firms‟ accrued 
needs for external funds. 
Prior research has also considered whether variations in equity values impact 
firms‟ capital structures. Using US data, Taggart (1977) finds that, to meet external 
financing needs, firms are more likely to issue debt when stock prices are low and stock 
when stock prices are high. Using British data, Marsh (1982) also finds that current 
market valuations, as well as past histories of security prices, influence firms‟ decisions 
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to issue debt or equity. More recently, Baker and Wurgler (2002) investigate whether 
market timing has a persistent effect on leverage ratios. They cite survey research by 
Graham and Harvey (2001), who report that more than two-thirds (66.94 percent) of 
CFO respondents consider the over- or under-valuation of their firms‟ equity when 
deciding whether to issue common stock. Similarly, 62.60 percent of respondents 
divulge that recent stock price movements impact this decision. Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) discover that fluctuations in equity prices have enduring impacts on firms‟ 
leverage ratios and thus conclude that “capital structure is the cumulative outcome of 
attempts to time the equity market” (p. 3). Similar to pecking order theory, market 
timing theory holds that firms lack target leverage ratios. 
Welch (2004) also studies the effect of stock price changes on companies‟ capital 
structures. According to his inertia theory, firms‟ leverage ratios vary mechanically as 
their equity values change. He finds that corporations do not counteract these 
fluctuations in their capital structures by issuing or repurchasing debt or equity. Rather, 
these distortions persist over several years. Welch (2004) concludes that “stock returns 
are the primary known component of capital structure and capital structure changes” (p. 
107). Like the pecking order and market timing theories, inertia theory also assumes that 
firms‟ leverage ratios do not converge on predetermined targets. 
An alternative to the three theories outlined previously, the tradeoff theory 
predicts that firms have optimal leverage ratios, and these target capital structures result 
from balancing the benefits and costs of debt. The benefits include interest deductions 
that firms use to offset taxable income and thus reduce their tax liabilities. The costs 
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include increased bankruptcy risks and agency conflicts between stock- and 
bondholders. When firms‟ leverage ratios diverge from optimal levels (due to 
fluctuations in stock price, unanticipated needs for external finance, etc.), the speeds at 
which these companies revert to their targets depend on adjustment costs. In the absence 
of adjustment costs, firms‟ leverage ratios correct immediately. At the opposite extreme, 
when adjustment costs are infinite, companies‟ capital structures remain at suboptimal 
levels permanently. Graham and Harvey (2001) find support for the existence of target 
leverage ratios. Specifically, they report that more than four-fifths (81 percent) of CFO 
respondents affirm that their firms have target capital structures. 
Several recent studies test the predictions of the pecking order theory and 
question this theory‟s ability to accurately explain empirical evidence. Fama and French 
(2002) examine both the tradeoff and the pecking order theories and their expectations 
concerning both leverage ratios and dividend payouts. The two theories share many 
predictions, and the empirical evidence from Fama and French (2002) generally supports 
these common hypotheses. However, the authors identify one “deep wound on the 
pecking order” (p. 30). Specifically, they discover that small, low-leverage growth firms 
issue new stock to meet their external financing needs, while theory predicts that they 
should issue debt instead. 
Frank and Goyal (2003) show that the broad predictions of pecking order theory 
do not hold for their sample, especially during the 1980s and 1990s; during this period, 
external finance was common, and equity finance was an important component. The 
authors calculate firms‟ financing deficit, a measure of their needs for external finance. 
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The pecking order theory predicts that the individual components of companies‟ 
financing deficits should have a dollar-for-dollar impact on corporate debt. Theory also 
holds that, when included in models with other conventional factors known to impact 
capital structure, the financing deficit should usurp the predictive power of the other 
variables. The empirical evidence from Frank and Goyal (2003) does not support these 
hypotheses. In addition, the pecking order theory should perform best for firms with 
severe adverse selection problems, such as small, high-growth firms with large 
information asymmetries. Contrary to this expectation, large firms were more likely to 
exhibit pecking order behavior. 
Fama and French (2005) test the pecking order predictions about financing 
decisions by examining how often and under what circumstances firms issue and 
repurchase equity. The authors find evidence inconsistent with the pecking order 
expectation that firms rarely issue stock. They examine numerous types of equity issues, 
including seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), stock issued in mergers and through private 
placements, convertible debt, warrants, direct purchase plans, rights issues, and 
employee options, grants, and benefit plans. From 1973 to 1982, 67 percent of the 
authors‟ sample issued equity every year. This percentage rose to 74 percent for 1983 to 
1992 and to 86 percent for 1993 to 2002. Equity issues are common among firms with 
moderate levels of leverage and those with financial surpluses, implying that stock is not 
a last resort for obtaining external funds. Fama and French (2005) conclude that “the 
pecking order, as the stand-alone model of capital structure proposed by Myers (1984), 
is dead” (p. 551). 
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The market timing and inertia theories also face recent criticisms for their 
inabilities to accurately characterize observed data. Leary and Roberts (2005) question 
how the costs of adjusting to target leverage ratios impact the predictions of the market 
timing and inertia theories: “Is the persistence that these studies [Baker and Wurgler 
2002 and Welch 2004] find a consequence of firms failing to rebalance their capital 
structures in response to various shocks, or a consequence of costly adjustment?” (p. 
2576). The authors‟ results indicate that firms do actively rebalance their capital 
structures but that adjustment costs prevent rapid reversions to optimal levels following 
shocks. The coefficient on the market timing variable from Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
declines as adjustment costs decrease, evidence that these costs influence the rate at 
which companies‟ leverage ratios revert to their targets. Leary and Roberts (2005) also 
discover that, when they re-estimate the model from Welch (2004), this model fails to 
differentiate between tradeoff and inertia theories. 
Liu (2005) reaches a conclusion similar to that of Leary and Roberts (2005). She 
conducts a battery of tests designed to test the market timing and inertia theories and 
finds that “the significance of the historical market-to-book ratio in Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) and the historical return variable in Welch (2004) in explaining a firm‟s capital 
structure is more consistent with a dynamic trade-off theory with adjustment costs than 
the alternative stories presented in those papers” (p.4). Thus, like Leary and Roberts 
(2005), Liu (2005) concludes that a dynamic tradeoff model in which firms establish 
target capital structures and adjustment costs dictate the speed at which they approach 
these optimal levels fits the data best. 
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Finance research investigating the influence of taxation on firms‟ capital 
structures has a long history. This research stream begins with Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), in which the authors find that, in the absence of taxes, firms‟ capital structures 
do not impact their market values. When Modigliani and Miller (1963) consider that 
interest paid on corporate debt reduces companies‟ taxable income but that dividends 
paid to stockholders are not deductible for tax purposes, the authors conclude that firms 
should finance operations entirely with debt. Miller (1977) extends this stream of 
research by examining the impact of shareholder taxation of interest and dividends on 
firms‟ capital structures. He finds that investors with low marginal tax rates, such as tax-
exempt institutions, are likely to hold bonds because the interest paid by these bonds 
generates little or no tax liability for these investors. Conversely, investors with high 
marginal tax rates are likely to hold non-dividend-paying stocks because these securities 
generate capital gains that are taxed more favorably than either dividends or interest. 
One of the underlying assumptions of Miller‟s study is that the highest marginal tax rate 
applies to all corporate taxpayers. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) relax this assumption, 
introducing other elements of the Internal Revenue Code, such as depreciation 
deductions and investment tax credits, into the analysis. They find that, when firms 
substitute these non-debt corporate tax shields for debt, “these realistic tax code features 
imply a unique interior optimum leverage decision for each firm in market equilibrium 
after all supply side adjustments are taken into account” (p. 4). 
Three more recent studies test the predictions of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). 
To my knowledge, MacKie-Mason (1990) is the first study to establish an unambiguous 
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association between firms‟ marginal tax rates and their financing choices. He argues 
that, if the probability of new debt issues decreases with firms‟ marginal tax rates 
because low-tax companies are unable to benefit from additional interest deductions, 
non-debt tax shields are only relevant if they reduce firms‟ marginal tax rates. Thus, he 
examines two non-debt tax shields with differing effects on marginal tax rates: Tax loss 
carryforwards imply that firms earn no taxable income and face zero marginal tax rates, 
while investment tax credits insinuate that companies possess profitable investment 
opportunities and are likely to face high marginal tax rates. MacKie-Mason (1990) finds 
that firms with tax loss carryforwards are less likely to issue new debt whereas 
investment tax credits do not lower the likelihood of selling new bonds. However, firms 
with sufficiently low taxable income (such that their investment tax credits offset the tax 
benefits of their interest deductions) are also unlikely to issue new debt, a condition 
known as “tax exhaustion” (p. 1473). Using the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 as 
a natural experimental setting, Trezevant (1992) finds additional support for the debt 
substitution effect from DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) as well as the tax exhaustion 
hypothesis from MacKie-Mason (1990).
1
 Manzon (1994) examines a sample of firms 
that retired debt early. His results indicate that (1) low-tax firms retire a greater 
percentage of debt than high-tax firms do and (2) firms retire debt early to reduce 
leverage when it exceeds a target level. These findings imply that firms possess optimal 
capital structures and that tax status impacts their adjustments toward these goals. 
Hypotheses, Methodology, and Data 
Recent empirical tests of the various capital structure theories (e.g., Leary and 
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Roberts 2005 and Liu 2005) reach the consensus that a dynamic tradeoff model that 
incorporates adjustment costs most accurately describes observed data. Tradeoff theory 
implies that firms establish target leverage ratios and revert to these targets following 
shocks. Researchers have ventured to measure that speed at which companies regress to 
their preferred capital structures. These studies reach vastly different conclusions 
depending on the samples and econometric techniques that the researchers employ. For 
example, using ordinary least squares regression and a sample of 157 large firms, 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) conclude that, “If our sample companies did have 
well-defined optimal debt ratios, it seems that their managers were not much interested 
in getting there” (p. 242). Similarly, using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression 
approach to control for cross correlation and biased standard errors and annual samples 
averaging more than 3,000 companies, Fama and French (2002) determine that, “The 
mean reversion of leverage is, however, at a snail‟s pace, 7-10% per year for dividend 
payers and 15-18% for nonpayers” (p. 24). At the opposite end of the adjustment speed 
spectrum, Jalilvand and Harris (1984) employ seemingly unrelated regression, examine a 
sample of 108 large firms, and report that the average sample firm closes 56.12 percent 
of the gap between actual and target long-term debt in a given year. 
More recently, Flannery and Rangan (2006) utilize a partial-adjustment model to 
investigate the existence of and the speed of convergence to firms‟ target leverage ratios. 
The authors compare seven econometric techniques that could be used to estimate their 
partial-adjustment model. They conclude that firm and year fixed-effects panel 
regression with fitted rather than actual values for the lagged dependent variable is most 
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appropriate methodology and discover that the average speed of convergence to target 
capital structures for firms in their sample is 34.4 percent per year. I borrow this 
estimation technique from Flannery and Rangan (2006) for use in this chapter.
2 
Prior research (e.g., MacKie-Mason 1990, Trezevant 1992, and Manzon 1994) 
demonstrates that firms‟ marginal tax rates influence their financing decisions and thus 
their observed leverage ratios. By logical extension, companies‟ tax statuses may also 
impact the speed at which they adjust to their target capital structures. Firms with high 
marginal tax rates can utilize the interest deductions associated with new debt issues to 
reduce their tax liabilities. Conversely, low-tax firms can sacrifice interest deductions by 
retiring debt without substantially increasing their tax burdens. Thus, I propose the 
following two hypotheses: 
H1: Among high-tax firms, companies below their optimal debt levels respond more 
quickly than companies above their targets. 
H2: Among low-tax firms, companies above their target capital structures adjust more 
rapidly than companies below their goals. 
I use the following fixed-effects model from Flannery and Rangan (2006) as a 
foundation for investigating how firms‟ tax statuses influence their speeds of adjustment 
to target leverage ratios; Appendix A details the derivation of this model: 
MDRjt+1 = 0 + 1 EBIT_TAjt + 2 MBjt + 3 Dep_TAjt + 4 ln(TA)jt + 
5 FA_TAjt + 6 R&D_Dumjt + 7 R&D_TAjt + 8 Ind_Medjt + 
9 Ratedjt +  Pred_MDRjt + firm and year indicator variables + 
jt+1 where (III-1) 
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MDRjt+1 = market debt ratio for firm j in year t+1 
EBIT_TAjt = earnings before interest and taxes, scaled by total assets, for firm j in 
year t 
MBjt = market-to-book ratio of assets for firm j in year t 
Dep_TAjt = depreciation expense, scaled by total assets, for firm j in year t 
ln(TA)jt = the natural logarithm of total assets, scaled by the consumer price 
index, for firm j in year t 
FA_TAjt = fixed assets, scaled by total assets, for firm j in year t 
R&D_Dumjt = an indicator variable coded 1 if firm j does not report research and 
development expense in year t, and 0 otherwise 
R&D_TAjt = research and development expense, scaled by total assets, for firm j in 
year t 
Ind_Medjt = industry median MDR for firm j in year t 
Ratedjt = an indicator variable coded 1 if firm j has a public debt rating in year 
t, and 0 otherwise 
Pred_MDRjt = predicted MDR for firm j in year t 
 = the speed of adjustment 
The speed of adjustment ( ) represents the proportion of the gap between firms‟ actual 
and target leverage ratios that closes during one year. Rather than use actual values of 
MDRjt, I use predicted values from the following ordinary least squares regression:
3 
MDRjt = 0 + 1 EBIT_TAjt + 2 MBjt + 3 Dep_TAjt + 4 ln(TA)jt + 5 
FA_TAjt + 6 R&D_Dumjt + 7 R&D_TAjt + 8 Ind_Medjt + 9 
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Ratedjt + 10 DRjt + jt where (III-2) 
BDRjt = book debt ratio for firm j in year t 
This instrumental variables approach addresses the correlation between the actual values 
of MDRjt and the error term jt+1. Table III-1 defines the variables used in all subsequent 
tables in the chapter. 
The explanatory variables in Model (III-1) originate in earlier capital structure 
studies. Specifically, Rajan and Zingales (1995) find that leverage is negatively 
correlated with EBIT_TA and MB and positively related to FA_TA and ln(TA). Fama 
and French (2002) demonstrate that leverage is negatively associated with Dep_TA and 
R&D_TA and positively correlated with R&D_Dum. Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and 
Tehranian (2004) report a direct relationship between leverage and Ind_Med. Faulkender 
and Petersen (2006) establish that a positive association exists between leverage and 
Rated. 
To test my hypotheses, I partition my sample into firm-year observations in 
which firms‟ actual leverage ratios lie below and above their targets, respectively. I also 
classify each firm-year observation as high- or low-tax. To this end, I create the 
following two variables: 
Belowjt = an indicator variable coded 1 if MDR* exceeds MDR for firm j in 
year t, and 0 otherwise 
High_Taxjt-1 = an indicator variable coded 1 if MTR for firm j in year t-1 is greater 
than top quartile (75
th
 percentile) MTR in year t-1, and 0 if MTR for 
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Table III-1. Chapter III Variable Definitions 
 
MDRjt = market debt ratio: [long-term debt (data 9) + debt in current liabilities (data 34)] / [(data 9) + (data 34) + 
common shares outstanding (data 25) • price at fiscal yearend (data 199)] 
Pred_MDRjt = predicted value from the regression of MDRjt on EBIT_TAjt, MBjt, Dep_TAjt, ln(TA)jt, FA_TAjt, R&D_Dumjt, R&D_TAjt, 
Ind_Medjt, Ratedjt, and BDRjt 
BDRjt = book debt ratio: [(data 9) + (data 34)] / total assets (data 6) 
EBIT_TAjt = profitability: earnings before interest and taxes [earnings before extraordinary items (data 18) + interest expense (data 15) + 
income taxes (data 16)] / (data 6) 
MBjt = growth opportunities: [(data 9) + (data 34) + preferred stock (data 10) + (data 25) • (data 199)] / (data 6) 
Dep_TAjt = depreciation tax shield: depreciation expense (data 14) / (data 6) 
ln(TA)jt = firm size (in 1983 dollars): natural logarithm of [(data 6) • 1,000,000] / consumer price index 
FA_TAjt = asset tangibility: property, plant, and equipment (data 8) / (data 6) 
R&D_Dumjt = an indicator variable coded 1 if research and development expense (data 46) is missing, and 0 otherwise 
R&D_TAjt = growth opportunities: (data 46) / (data 6) 
Ind_Medjt = industry effects: industry median MDRjt calculated for each year based on the 48 industry groupings in Fama and French (1997) 
Ratedjt = an indicator variable coded 1 if credit rating (data 280) exists, and 0 otherwise 
MTRjt-1 = one-year lagging marginal tax rate (MTR) based on income after interest expense has been deducted 
High_Taxjt = an indicator variable coded 1 if MTRjt-1 is greater than third quartile MTRjt-1 in each year, and 0 if MTRjt-1 is less than 
first quartile MTRjt-1 in each year 
Belowjt = an indicator variable coded 1 if a firm's actual MDRjt lies below its target MDRjt, and 0 otherwise 
Debt_Chjt = issuance of long-term debt (data 111) - reduction of long-term debt (data 114) 
Debt_Adjjt = an indicator variable coded 1 if the absolute value of Debt_Chjt exceeds one percent of total assets (data 6), and 0 otherwise 
Equity_Chjt = sale of common and preferred stock (data 108) - purchase of common and preferred stock (data 115) 
Equity_Adjjt = an indicator variable coded 1 if the absolute value of Equity_Chjt exceeds one percent of total assets (data 6), and 0 otherwise 
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firm j in year t-1 is less than bottom quartile (25
th
 percentile) MTR in 
year t-1 
MDR*jt represents the target leverage ratio for firm j in year t. I calculate this variable as 
the predicted value of MDRjt from the following ordinary least squares regression: 
MDRjt = 0 + 1 EBIT_TAjt + 2 MBjt + 3 Dep_TAjt + 4 ln(TA)jt + 5 
FA_TAjt + 6 R&D_Dumjt + 7 R&D_TAjt + 8 Ind_Medjt + 9 
Ratedjt + jt (III-3) 
I use High_Tax to classify firms according to tax status. To calculate High_Tax, I 
download companies‟ simulated marginal tax rates from John Graham‟s website 
(http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham). If a firm‟s simulated marginal tax rate based 
on income after interest expense has been deducted in year t-1 (MTRjt-1) exceeds the 
sample top quartile (75
th
 percentile) value for that year, I code High_Tax as 1, and 0 if 
MTRjt-1 lies below the sample bottom quartile (25
th
 percentile) value.
4,5
 
To test H1, I examine the sample of firm-year observations for which High_Tax 
assumes a value of 1. I then divide this sample into two sub-samples based on Below. I 
separately estimate Model (III-1) for the two sub-samples with Below values of 1 and 0, 
respectively, and compare the value of  from these two regressions. A higher value of  
for firms below their optimal debt levels relative to firms above these targets supports 
H1. To test H2, I examine the sub-sample of firm-year observations for which High_Tax 
assumes a value of 0. For this sub-sample, a higher value of  for firms above their 
target capital structures relative to firms below these goals supports H2. 
Alternatively, to test H1 and H2, I add Below as an additional explanatory 
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variable to Model (III-1), interact Pred_MDR with Below, and estimate this expanded 
model separately for high- and low-tax firms, respectively. For high-tax companies, a 
negative coefficient on the interaction term Pred_MDR • Below implies that firms below 
their optimal debt levels move more quickly toward their target capital structures than 
firms above these targets, support for H1. For low-tax companies, a positive coefficient 
on the interaction term Pred_MDR • Below implies that firms above their target capital 
structures adjust more rapidly toward their optimal debt levels than firms below these 
goals, support for H2. 
My initial sample contains 247,048 firm-year observations from 1980 to 2001 
from the Compustat database.
6,7
 Following Flannery and Rangan (2006), I delete utilities 
(SIC codes 4900-4999) and financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and classify the 
remaining firms into the industry groupings from Fama and French (1997), eliminating 
62,382 observations. I merge these data with consumer price index (CPI) data from the 
Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
(http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/9) and simulated marginal tax rate data 
calculated by John Graham (http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham), purging an 
additional 25,368 observations. I also remove observations with missing or illogical 
values for the fields needed to calculate the response and explanatory variables in 
Models (III-1) and (III-2). This cut reduces the sample size by 104,916 observations. 
Calculating one-year-ahead market debt ratios to estimate Model (III-1) and purging 
firm-year observations with lagged marginal tax rates between the first and third quartile 
values decrease the sample by 11,667 and 35,391 observations, respectively. To estimate 
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a regression model with firm fixed effects, I require at least two years of data for each 
sample firm. This requirement eliminates 3,588 observations and yields a final sample of 
3,736 firm-year observations. I winsorize all continuous variables at the 1
st
 and the 99
th
 
percentiles to lessen the effect of outlying observations on regression results. 
Results 
Table III-2 presents descriptive statistics for my sample of 3,736 firm-year 
observations. Overall, these summary statistics are similar to those reported by Flannery 
and Rangan (2006) in their Table 1 (p. 474), despite the different sample periods that we 
use in our studies. The mean market debt ratio for my sample (0.3056) is higher than the 
mean value for their sample (0.2783), but my median values are close (0.2249 and 
0.2252, respectively). Both mean (18.2400) and median (18.1126) firm size (measured 
as the natural logarithm of total assets in 1983 dollars) for their sample exceed these 
statistics for my sample (13.8807 and 14.0322, respectively). If small firms adjust their 
leverage ratios more quickly than large firms due to the lower costs associated with 
acquiring bank debt relative to issuing public debt, I expect that firms in my sample 
converge to their optimal capital structures at a more rapid pace than companies in the 
study by Flannery and Rangan (2006). The mean values for High_Tax and Below 
indicate that (1) I classify 42.85 percent of firm-year observations in my sample as high-
tax and (2) 61.22 percent of firm-year observations have actual market debt ratios that lie 
below the target levels predicted by Model (III-3). Among high-tax firms, values of 
MTRjt-1 range from 34 percent to 46 percent; for low-tax companies, these minimum and 
maximum values are 0 percent and 9 percent, respectively.
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Table III-2. Chapter III Descriptive Statistics         
             
Variable  N  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Median  Max. 
MDRjt  3,736   0.3056  0.2499  0.0010  0.2249  0.9486 
MDRjt+1  3,736   0.3166  0.2582  0.0009  0.2396  0.9668 
Pred_MDRjt  3,736   0.3227  0.1852  0.0005  0.2954  0.9966 
BDRjt  3,736   0.3234  0.2441  0.0031  0.2758  1.2764 
EBIT_TAjt  3,736   0.0042  0.2348  -1.3316  0.0710  0.3250 
MBjt  3,736   1.4721  1.1233  0.3055  1.1752  10.9849 
Dep_TAjt  3,736   0.0543  0.0361  0.0061  0.0457  0.2210 
ln(TA)jt  3,736   13.8807  2.2883  9.2215  14.0322  18.9267 
FA_TAjt  3,736   0.6282  0.3891  0.0454  0.5634  2.1623 
R&D_Dumjt  3,736   0.5166  0.4998  0  1  1 
R&D_TAjt  3,736   0.0401  0.0929  0  0  0.6874 
Ind_Medjt  3,736   0.2459  0.1108  0.0427  0.2389  0.5353 
Ratedjt  3,736   0.2717  0.4449  0  0  1 
High_Taxjt  3,736   0.4285  0.4949  0  0  1 
MTRjt-1 (High_Taxjt = 1)  1,601   0.3546  0.0155  0.3400  0.3500  0.4614 
MTRjt-1 (High_Taxjt = 0)  2,135   0.0034  0.0056  0.0000  0.0000  0.0911 
Belowjt  3,736   0.6122  0.4873  0  1  1 
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Before proceeding with regression analyses, I examine the Pearson and 
Spearman correlations among the variables in Models (III-1) and (III-2). Table III-3 
presents this correlation matrix. As expected, each of the explanatory variables is highly 
correlated with MDRjt and MDRjt+1, my measures of leverage. With the exception of 
Dep_TA and ln(TA), each of these correlations has the sign predicted by prior research. 
While Dep_TA could proxy for firms‟ depreciation tax shields, implying that larger 
depreciation expense reduces the need for the interest deductions generated by debt, this 
variable could also proxy for asset tangibility since fixed assets generate depreciation 
deductions. The latter scenario implies a positive relationship between MDR and 
Dep_TA. The negative correlation between ln(TA) and the response variables may stem 
from a greater percentage of small firms in my sample relative to the sample from 
Flannery and Rangan (2006). 
Most of the explanatory variables are highly correlated with one another, 
indicating that some of the variables may capture the same underlying construct. For 
example, both the Pearson and Spearman correlations between MB and R&D_TA are 
positive and highly significant, indicating that both of these variables may proxy for 
companies‟ growth opportunities. These large correlations among explanatory variables 
indicate that multicollinearity may adversely affect regression results. 
Before proceeding with tests of H1 and H2, which require partitioning my total 
sample into sub-samples according to tax status (high or low) and leverage position 
(below or above target), I estimate three variations of Model (III-1) using all 3,736 firm-
year observations. Table III-4 presents these results. First, I regress MDRjt on the first 
  
7
2
 
Table III-3. Chapter III Correlation Matrix             
                 
  Variable 
Variable  MDRjt  MDRjt+1  Pred_MDRjt  BDRjt  EBIT_TAjt  MBjt  Dep_TAjt  ln(TA)jt 
MDRjt    0.86857***  0.86139***  0.72404***  -0.11080***  -0.31698***  0.06754***  -0.09721*** 
MDRjt+1  0.85913***    0.78104***  0.65690***  -0.08999***  -0.26514***  0.04117**  -0.10235*** 
Pred_MDRjt  0.91601***  0.81106***    0.89563***  -0.17484***  -0.16917***  0.08015***  -0.11927*** 
BDRjt  0.81859***  0.72377***  0.89213***    -0.28784***  0.21412***  0.16954***  -0.09761*** 
EBIT_TAjt  -0.29246***  -0.25026***  -0.29695***  -0.25700***    -0.35013***  -0.35385***  0.44951*** 
MBjt  -0.54818***  -0.45895***  -0.36638***  -0.05311***  0.18334***    0.11225***  -0.10259*** 
Dep_TAjt  0.02202  -0.00569  0.00446  0.04829***  -0.13151***  0.05223***    -0.20626*** 
ln(TA)jt  -0.06146***  -0.05999***  -0.10843***  -0.03990**  0.46640***  0.06121***  -0.11820***   
FA_TAjt  0.10334***  0.08844***  0.10888***  0.07152***  0.02116  -0.07021***  0.58627***  0.01904 
R&D_Dumjt  0.20375***  0.22085***  0.27201***  0.14503***  0.04944***  -0.15479***  0.00898  0.02528 
R&D_TAjt  -0.25650***  -0.27519***  -0.31664***  -0.16631***  -0.15068***  0.21368***  0.04522***  -0.12371*** 
Ind_Medjt  0.35011***  0.33653***  0.47875***  0.20976***  0.06327***  -0.30375***  0.02095  0.11735*** 
Ratedjt  0.05691***  0.04069**  0.02209  0.11579***  0.23579***  0.07860***  -0.04063**  0.66116*** 
MTRjt-1  -0.26560***  -0.23766***  -0.27816***  -0.25187***  0.54694***  0.08955***  -0.08020***  0.51784*** 
High_Taxjt  -0.29512***  -0.26138***  -0.30322***  -0.25717***  0.57809***  0.14511***  -0.06377***  0.59384*** 
Belowjt  -0.71384***  -0.63658***  -0.63345***  -0.69188***  0.23461***  0.27265***  0.02359  0.11102*** 
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Table III-3. Continued           
                 
  Variable 
Variable  FA_TAjt  R&D_Dumjt  R&D_TAjt  Ind_Medjt  Ratedjt  MTRjt-1  High_Taxjt  Belowjt 
MDRjt  0.10249***  0.19260***  -0.16533***  0.34922***  0.01919  -0.33214***  -0.33406***  -0.74113*** 
MDRjt+1  0.08478***  0.20714***  -0.17998***  0.33156***  0.00161  -0.30330***  -0.30565***  -0.66011*** 
Pred_MDRjt 0.11951***  0.25099***  -0.15442***  0.44649***  0.01318  -0.31646***  -0.31809***  -0.62676*** 
BDRjt  0.10714***  0.10832***  0.03594**  0.15462***  0.07290***  -0.29104***  -0.29081***  -0.64323*** 
EBIT_TAjt  -0.09121***  0.13030***  -0.56007***  0.15419***  0.21070***  0.42273***  0.42128***  0.09607*** 
MBjt  0.01011  -0.13990***  0.37076***  -0.24531***  -0.00840  -0.01768  -0.01416  0.06709*** 
Dep_TAjt  0.53771***  0.03667**  0.17405***  0.02630  -0.06952***  -0.15286***  -0.15161***  -0.01465 
ln(TA)jt  -0.04872***  0.02280  -0.25292***  0.10785***  0.64748***  0.57576***  0.58396***  0.10682*** 
FA_TAjt    0.14800***  -0.00884  0.16957***  0.03058*  -0.02238  -0.01973  0.02500 
R&D_Dumjt  0.12593***    -0.44609***  0.40912***  0.04173**  0.01735  0.01941  0.02808* 
R&D_TAjt  -0.13540***  -0.93219***    -0.38367***  -0.14935***  -0.19341***  -0.19276***  -0.01471 
Ind_Medjt  0.19719***  0.42908***  -0.50827***    0.09302***  -0.00289  -0.00316  -0.01268 
Ratedjt  0.04977***  0.04173**  -0.10318***  010739***    0.29233***  0.29917***  0.04528*** 
MTRjt-1  0.02584  0.00010  -0.06553***  -0.01873  0.25221***    0.99801***  0.29125*** 
High_Taxjt  0.04507***  0.01941  -0.08206***  0.00372  0.29917***  0.87292***    0.29299*** 
Belowjt  0.03618**  0.02808*  -0.01428  -0.00451  0.04528***  0.27487***  0.29299***   
                 
*** The coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level.           
** The coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level.           
* The coefficient is significant at the 0.1 level.           
                 
Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients appear above and below the diagonals, respectively. 
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Table III-4. Model (III-1) Coefficient Estimates 
            
    Response Variable 
Variable  Prediction  MDRjt  MDRjt+1  MDRjt+1 
Intercept  ?  -0.1183   -0.6674 ***  -0.7960 *** 
EBIT_TAjt  -  -0.2098 ***  -0.1026 ***  -0.0098  
MBjt  -  -0.0598 ***  -0.0186 ***  -0.0030  
Dep_TAjt  -  0.1248   0.1179   0.2253  
ln(TA)jt  +  0.0188 ***  0.0537 ***  0.0543 *** 
FA_TAjt  +  0.1033 ***  0.0549 ***  0.0290 * 
R&D_Dumjt  +  0.0294 **  0.0574 ***  0.0473 *** 
R&D_TAjt  -  -0.1211 **  -0.0321   -0.0056  
Ind_Medjt  +  0.3665 ***  0.2201 ***  -0.0090  
Ratedjt  +  0.0314 ***  -0.0111   -0.0154  
Pred_MDRjt  +        0.4372 *** 
            
         0.5628  
N    3,736   3,736   3,736  
R
2
    91.56%   86.32%   87.25%  
            
I estimate these coefficients using fixed-effects models.     
Tests for no fixed effects yield highly significant F-statistics (p<0.0001) for all models. 
I omit firm and year indicator variables from the table for concision.    
            
*** The coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level.      
** The coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level.       
* The coefficient is significant at the 0.1 level.       
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nine explanatory variables, excluding Pred_MDRjt. With the exception of Dep_TA, 
coefficients for these explanatory variables are statistically significant in the expected 
direction. Second, I regress MDRjt+1 on these first nine independent variables and find 
that R&D_TA and Rated are no longer significant predictors of one-year leading 
leverage. Finally, I regress MDRjt+1 on these nine explanatory variables and 
Pred_MDRjt. The coefficient on Pred_MDR is positive and significant. However, many 
of the other independent variables (EBIT_TA, MB, and Ind_Med) lose their predictive 
power. These results indicate that, for my sample, eight of the first nine explanatory 
variables share associations with leverage that prior research documents; however, when 
I add Pred_MDR to the model, this variable usurps predictive power. 
Tests for no fixed effects (untabulated) yield highly significant F-statistics 
(p<0.0001), indicating the importance of controlling for firm and year fixed effects by 
including indicator variables in Model (III-1). The explanatory power of Model (III-1), 
as measured by R
2
, is 87.25 percent.
8
 The (1- ) coefficient on Pred_MDR (0.4372) 
implies that the average sample firm closes approximately 56 percent of the gap between 
its actual and target leverage ratio per year. This  value is greater than the 34.4 percent 
reported by Flannery and Rangan (2006). This more rapid average adjustment speed may 
stem from our different sample periods and the presence of smaller firms in my sample. 
The Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients from Table III-3 reveal that 
many of the explanatory variables in Model (III-1) are highly correlated. Thus, I 
examine each explanatory variable‟s variance inflation factor (VIF) to determine how 
much of that variable‟s variation is explained by the other predictors in the model and 
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ultimately if multicollinearity impacts the regression results. No variable‟s VIF is larger 
than 3.0, implying that multicollinearity is not a severe problem. 
I first test H1 by examining a sub-sample of high-tax firms (High_Tax=1). To 
determine whether the speed of adjustment differs between firms below and above their 
target leverage ratios, I divide this sub-sample of 1,601 firm-year observations according 
to their values of Below, yielding 1,244 firms below their optimal debt levels (77.7 
percent) and 357 companies above their goals (22.3 percent). I estimate Model (III-1) 
separately for these two groups, and Table III-5 displays the results. Among the firms 
below their targets, the coefficient on Pred_MDR is 0.3944, and  is approximately 61 
percent. By contrast, for the companies above their targets, the coefficient on Pred_MDR 
is 0.5820, implying a  value of almost 42 percent. Thus, when comparing speeds of 
convergence for high-tax firms, I find support for H1. Consistent with my prediction, 
high-tax firms below their optimal debt levels appear to respond more quickly than high-
tax companies above their targets. 
I first test H2 using the same approach. I study a sub-sample of 2,135 low-tax 
firm-year observations (High_Tax=0), 1,043 of which have actual leverage ratios below 
their targets (48.9 percent) and 1,092 of which have debt levels above their goals (51.1 
percent). The values of  for these two groups are approximately 52 percent and 72 
percent, respectively. Thus, among low-tax firms, I find support for H2; firms above their 
capital structure targets seem to respond more quickly to shocks than companies below 
these goals.
9
 
In Table III-6, I re-test H1 and H2 by adding Below to Model (III-1) as a main 
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Table III-5. Model (III-1) Coefficient Estimates, Partitioned on High_Taxjt and Belowjt 
               
    High_Taxjt = 1  High_Taxjt = 0 
Variable  Prediction  Belowjt = 1  Belowjt = 0  Belowjt = 1  Belowjt = 0 
Intercept  ?  -0.6331 **  -0.6519   -0.9012 ***  -0.4155 * 
EBIT_TAjt  -  -0.1448 ***  -0.0835   -0.0125   -0.0025  
MBjt  -  -0.0035   0.0136   0.0190   -0.0089  
Dep_TAjt  -  0.1100   -0.9647   0.1519   0.3149  
ln(TA)jt  +  0.0532 ***  0.0500   0.0528 ***  0.0525 *** 
FA_TAjt  +  0.0609 *  0.1857 *  0.0249   0.0219  
R&D_Dumjt  +  -0.0405   0.0554   0.0846 ***  0.0328  
R&D_TAjt  -  0.0638   -0.6813 *  -0.0235   0.1218  
Ind_Medjt  +  -0.1566   0.2432 *  0.0236   0.0140  
Ratedjt  +  0.0030   -0.0793   0.0068   -0.0223  
Pred_MDRjt  +  0.3944 ***  0.5820 ***  0.4821 ***  0.2800 *** 
               
   0.6056   0.4180   0.5179   0.7200  
N    1,244   357   1,043   1,092  
R
2
    78.82%   87.95%   73.21%   79.34%  
               
The response variable is MDRjt+1.           
I estimate these coefficients using fixed-effects models.        
I omit firm and year indicator variables from the table for concision.       
               
*** The coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level.         
** The coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level.          
* The coefficient is significant at the 0.1 level.          
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Table III-6. Model (III-1) Coefficient Estimates, Partitioned on High_Taxjt 
         
Variable  Prediction  High_Taxjt = 1  High_Taxjt = 0 
Intercept  ?  -0.6295 **  -0.4853 *** 
EBIT_TAjt  -  -0.1372 **  -0.0046  
MBjt  -  0.0037   -0.0024  
Dep_TAjt  -  -0.1760   0.2801  
ln(TA)jt  +  0.0484 ***  0.0539 *** 
FA_TAjt  +  0.0574 *  0.0215  
R&D_Dumjt  +  -0.0359   0.0747 *** 
R&D_TAjt  -  -0.4430 *  0.0043  
Ind_Medjt  +  -0.0213   0.0041  
Ratedjt  +  -0.0266   -0.0122  
Pred_MDRjt  +  0.6421 ***  0.3181 *** 
Belowjt  ?  0.0637 **  -0.1294 *** 
Pred_MDRjt • Belowjt  - / +  -0.2860 ***  0.1231 ** 
         
 - firms below targets   0.6439   0.5587  
 - firms above targets   0.3579   0.6819  
N    1,601   2,135  
R
2
    87.52%   86.09%  
         
The response variable is MDRjt+1.       
I estimate these coefficients using fixed-effects models.    
I omit firm and year indicator variables from the table for concision.  
         
*** The coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level.     
** The coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level.     
* The coefficient is significant at the 0.1 level.     
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effect and interacting this variable with Pred_MDR to determine the impact of tax status 
on firms‟ speeds of adjustment to their target capital structures. When I examine high-
tax firms (High_Tax=1), I find a significantly positive coefficient for Pred_MDR 
(0.6421) and a significantly negative coefficient for Pred_MDR • Below (-0.2860), 
implying that  approximates 64 percent and 36 percent for firms below and above their 
target debt levels, respectively. Thus, I find additional support for H1; the significantly 
negative coefficient for Pred_MDR • Below indicates that firms below their optimal debt 
levels converge on their targets more rapidly than companies above their goals. Focusing 
on low-tax firms (High_Tax=0), results indicate that firms above their optimal leverage 
ratios adjust more rapidly than companies below their targets. These  values 
approximate 68 percent and 56 percent, respectively. The interaction term Pred_MDR • 
Below is positive and highly significant, providing support for H2. 
Separate Analyses of Debt and Equity Adjusters 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 assume that firms converge on target leverage ratios by 
issuing or retiring debt (debt adjusters). However, companies may also achieve this goal 
by selling or repurchasing equity (equity adjusters). Since interest paid on debt is 
deductible for tax purposes while dividends paid on stock are not, the tax motivations 
associated with these securities differ. Thus, Hypotheses 1 and 2 should obtain for debt 
adjusters but not for equity adjusters. I borrow the empirical methodology from 
Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) to identify and separately examine debt and 
equity adjusters. Specifically, I create the following two variables: 
Debt_Adjjt = an indicator variable coded 1 if the absolute value of Debt_Ch 
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exceeds one percent of total assets, and 0 otherwise 
Equity_Adjjt = an indicator variable coded 1 if the absolute value of Equity_Ch 
exceeds one percent of total assets, and 0 otherwise 
I define Debt_Ch as the difference between firms‟ issuances and reductions of long-term 
debt during the current year. Positive values for Debt_Ch indicate that firms assumed 
additional liabilities, and negative values imply debt retirements. I define Equity_Ch as 
the difference between firms‟ sales and repurchases of stock during the current year.10 
Positive values for Equity_Ch signify that companies issued equity, and negative values 
denote stock repurchases. I classify firms as debt or equity adjusters, respectively, if the 
absolute value of Debt_Ch or Equity_Ch exceeds one percent of total assets.
11
 
Table III-7 presents the results of separately analyzing debt and equity adjusters. 
As in Table III-6, I first examine a sub-sample of high-tax firms (High_Tax=1). Within 
this sub-sample, debt adjusters (Debt_Adj =1) with leverage ratios below their targets 
adjusted more rapidly ( =0.6029) than debt adjusters with liability levels above their 
goals ( =0.2004), and this difference in adjustment speeds is statistically significant. 
However, for high-tax equity adjusters (Equity_Adj=1), the difference in adjustments 
speeds between companies below and above their optimal capital structures is 
statistically insignificant. I next investigate a sub-sample of low-tax firms 
(High_Tax=0). As predicted, debt adjusters in this sub-sample with leverage ratios above 
their targets closed approximately 18 percent more of this gap than debt adjusters with 
liability levels below their goals, and this  difference is highly significant. In contrast, 
among low-tax equity adjusters, the coefficient on Pred_MDR • Below lacks 
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Table III-7. Model (III-1) Coefficient Estimates, Partitioned on High_Taxjt and Debt_Adjjt / Equity_Adjjt 
               
    High_Taxjt = 1  High_Taxjt = 0 
Variable  Prediction  Debt_Adjjt = 1  Equity_Adjjt = 1  Debt_Adjjt = 1  Equity_Adjjt = 1 
Intercept  ?  -0.9461 ***  -0.1365   -0.7884 ***  -0.5647  
EBIT_TAjt  -  -0.1518 **  -0.0199   0.0169   0.0189  
MBjt  -  0.0104   0.0039   0.0022   0.0003  
Dep_TAjt  -  0.0324   -0.4533   0.2411   0.7150  
ln(TA)jt  +  0.0592 ***  0.0077   0.0579 ***  0.0614 *** 
FA_TAjt  +  0.0761 *  0.0565   0.0091 **  -0.0834  
R&D_Dumjt  +  0.0143   -0.0954   0.1051 ***  0.0623  
R&D_TAjt  -  -1.4490 ***  -1.0622 ***  0.0654   0.2852  
Ind_Medjt  +  -0.0825   0.0305   0.0511   -0.1119  
Ratedjt  +  -0.0419   -0.0082   -0.0243   -0.0064  
Pred_MDRjt  +  0.7996 ***  0.6594 ***  0.3194 ***  0.1546 * 
Belowjt  ?  0.1411 ***  0.0747   -0.1578 ***  -0.0908  
Pred_MDRjt • Belowjt  - / ? / + / ?  -0.4025 ***  -0.1659   0.1849 **  0.1782  
               
 - firms below targets   0.6029   0.5065   0.4957   0.6672  
 - firms above targets   0.2004   0.3406   0.6806   0.8454  
N    982   519   1,538   557  
R
2
    87.99%   88.99%   86.26%   81.37%  
 
  
8
2
 
 
Table III-7. Continued 
               
The response variable is MDRjt+1.  
I estimate these coefficients using fixed-effects models.          
Tests for no fixed effects yield highly significant F-statistics (p<0.0001) for all models.     
I omit firm and year indicator variables from the table for concision.        
               
*** The coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level.         
** The coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level.          
* The coefficient is significant at the 0.1 level.           
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significance. These results in Table III-7 are consistent with debt adjusters capitalizing 
on the tax benefits of leverage. That is, high-tax debt adjusters below their target debt 
ratios adjust rapidly toward these goals, likely because these companies benefit from the 
interest deductions that additional debt provides. Similarly, low-tax debt adjusters above 
their optimal capital structures move quickly toward these targets, evidently because 
these firms abandon little or no tax benefit upon retiring debt. This pattern does not exist 
for equity adjusters, presumably because these companies lack the tax motivations that 
debt adjusters enjoy. 
Conclusion 
Recent research indicates that firms establish target capital structures by 
weighing the costs and benefits of debt and that adjustment costs dictate how rapidly 
companies move toward their optimal leverage ratios. If tax considerations impact firms‟ 
debt levels then taxes are also likely to influence their rates of adjustment to target 
levels. The purpose of this chapter is to examine this issue empirically. Specifically, I 
hypothesize that, among high-tax firms, companies below their optimal leverage ratios 
respond more quickly than companies above these targets because high-tax firms can 
better utilize the interest deductions generated by issuing additional debt to reduce their 
tax liabilities. Conversely, I expect that, among low-tax firms, companies above their 
target capital structures adjust more rapidly than companies below their goals because 
low-tax firms have less need of interest deductions to decrease their tax burdens and thus 
sacrifice less tax benefit when retiring debt. Empirical evidence supports these 
predictions. 
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Notes 
1. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 accelerated the rate at which firms 
depreciated fixed assets by shortening their lives for cost recovery purposes. This 
legislation also created a new tax credit for research and development expenditures 
and extended the useful life of tax loss carryforwards from seven to 15 years. 
2. Maddala (1986) considers a partial-adjustment model of dividend payments and 
states that such a model “assumes that dividends can be changed continuously. It 
does not capture the fact that dividends are increased in discrete jumps” (p. 163). 
Similarly, firms make discrete changes to their capital structures by issuing/retiring 
debt and issuing/repurchasing equity. Thus, the model that I use in this study faces 
the limitation that Maddala mentions. Using simulated data, Flannery and Rangan 
(2006) explore the consequences of sporadic adjustments on the coefficients that 
result from estimating a smooth partial-adjustment model and find that the 
resulting bias is economically unimportant. 
3. I remove from the sample observations with illogical values of Pred_MDR greater 
than 1 or less than 0. 
4. Because firms‟ marginal tax rates and leverage ratios share an endogenous 
relationship, I use one-year lagging marginal tax rates based on income after 
interest expense has been deducted to calculate High_Tax. Alternatively, based on 
Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim (1998), I use contemporaneous marginal tax 
rates based on income before interest expense has been deducted to classify firms 
as high- or low-tax. The regression results in Tables III-5 and III-6 are qualitatively 
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unaltered by this modification. 
5. A large number of sample firms possess marginal tax rates equal to the sample 
median value. Rather than arbitrarily assign these firms to the high- or low-tax sub-
sample, I delete firms with MTRs between the first and third quartile values. This 
decision reduces my sample size but provides a cleaner test of the impact of tax 
status on speed of adjustment. 
6. The sample period in Flannery and Rangan (2006) begins in 1965 rather than 1980. 
However, simulated marginal tax rate data are not readily available for years prior 
to 1980. 
7. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), the last significant restructuring of the 
Internal Revenue Code, occurred during my sample period. I attempt to conduct 
sub-period analyses to determine if this change in tax law impacts my results. 
However, I lack sufficient observations with complete data in the pre-TRA86 
period (97 firm-year observations from years 1980 to 1986) to estimate Model (III-
1) and test my hypotheses. The results of estimating Model (III-1) during the post-
TRA86 sub-period (3,639 firm-year observations from years 1987 to 2001) are 
qualitatively unaltered from those reported in Tables 2 through 6 for the entire 
sample period, implying that pooling the pre- and post-TRA86 sub-samples is 
acceptable. 
8. When I estimate this model without firm and year fixed effects, this R2 statistic 
falls to 63.20 percent. 
9. I also estimate Model (III-1) using firm-year observations with MTR measures 
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between the bottom quartile (25
th
 percentile) and top quartile (75
th
 percentile) 
values (that is, observations that I classify as neither high- nor low-tax and thus 
delete from my sample). In untabulated results, I find  values of approximately 49 
percent and 51 percent for the sub-samples of observations with actual leverage 
ratios below and above their targets, respectively. As expected, these adjustment 
speeds are slower than those of the high-tax observations below their optimal debt 
levels and the low-tax observations above their target capital structures. 
10. In sensitivity testing, I re-define Debt_Ch as the difference in firms‟ total debt 
levels (the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities) between the 
current year and the previous year. Similarly, I re-define Equity_Ch as the year-to-
year change in firms‟ common stock levels. Neither of these changes qualitatively 
alters the coefficient estimates in Table III-7. 
11. My methodology for classifying firms as debt or equity adjusters differs from that 
of Hovakimian et al. (2001) in two ways. First, those authors require sample firms‟ 
changes in debt or equity to exceed five percent of total assets to qualify as debt 
and equity adjusters, whereas I use a one-percent benchmark. Second, the prior 
study omits from the sample all firms that adjust both debt and equity during a 
single year, whereas I retain these firms in my sample. Precisely mimicking the 
methodology from Hovakimian et al. (2001) decreases my sample size to a level 
that precludes estimation of necessary fixed-effects models. These two deviations 
contribute noise that biases against finding my expected results. Thus, discovering 
support for my predictions despite this noise bolsters the reliability of my results. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
MANAGING EARNINGS BY MANIPULATING PRODUCTION: 
 
COORDINATING TAX AND FINANCIAL REPORTING INCENTIVES 
 
 
Introduction 
Firms that meet or beat their quarterly consensus analyst forecasts enjoy higher 
returns than companies that miss these income goals (Bartov, Givoly, and Hahn 2002). 
Thus, firms that would otherwise fall short of these benchmarks face incentives to 
manage their book income upward. Companies also face incentives to improve their cash 
flows by reducing their taxable income and associated tax liabilities. Because book and 
tax income numbers are positively correlated, firms must coordinate these opposing 
incentives when making business decisions that affect profits. Numerous studies have 
investigated this tradeoff, and a survey of this literature reveals that neither tax nor 
financial reporting considerations consistently dominate the other factor. Thus, 
additional research is merited. 
In this chapter, I examine an earnings management strategy that is unique to 
manufacturing firms. Specifically, companies that miss their earnings benchmarks can 
produce inventory in excess of sales, thereby shifting fixed manufacturing costs from 
cost of goods sold (COGS) to inventory accounts, increasing income, and potentially 
reaching their earnings targets. In contrast, firms that beat their income goals can 
underproduce relative to sales, transferring fixed costs from asset to expense accounts, 
reducing profits, and building “cookie jar” reserves for use in future periods. I also 
investigate two tax management strategies. First, as firms’ marginal tax rates (MTRs) 
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rise, they incur larger tax liabilities as their taxable income increases (or enjoy greater 
tax savings as their taxable income falls). Thus, high-tax companies have a greater 
incentive to reduce their taxable earnings than low-tax firms possess. Second, firms face 
motivations to lower taxable income in the fourth quarter, relative to the first three 
quarters of the year, for purposes of minimizing the current year’s tax liability (or 
maximizing the refund) and the subsequent year’s estimated tax payments. 
The purpose of this chapter is to extend the tax and financial reporting tradeoff 
literature by studying how taxes influence manufacturing companies’ production 
decisions in the presence of financial reporting incentives. For firms that exceed their 
earnings benchmarks absent production manipulation, book and tax incentives align; 
thus, I predict that these companies make discretionary inventory decreases and that 
these cuts to production are larger as MTRs rise and in the fourth quarter relative to the 
first three quarters. I find results consistent with these hypotheses. 
For firms that miss their income targets without modifying inventory, book and 
tax incentives are opposed; therefore, I expect that these companies make discretionary 
inventory increases but that these increases are smaller as MTRs climb and in the fourth 
quarter compared to the previous three quarters. The sub-sample of firms that miss their 
earnings goals provides an opportunity to study whether tax or financial reporting 
considerations dominate in this setting. I discover that these companies accelerate 
production (relative to sales) to improve their book income and potentially reach their 
consensus analyst forecasts. I also find that higher MTRs do not prevent these firms 
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from augmenting inventory to increase income, but tax timing considerations attenuate 
this earnings management strategy in the fourth quarter. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I review 
three streams of literature relevant to my research topic. Then, I formalize my 
hypotheses and detail the data and two-stage regression methodology that I use to test 
them. In the subsequent section, I provide the results of these tests. Finally, I conclude 
and outline future research opportunities in this area. 
Literature Review 
Effective tax planning and tax minimization are not synonymous (Scholes et al. 
2005). Given the positive correlation between income for tax and financial reporting 
purposes, strategies that minimize taxes may lead to reductions in book earnings and 
associated declines in firm value.
1
 Thus, firms must weigh the financial reporting costs 
against the tax benefits of prospective business decisions. Many studies have examined 
this tradeoff.
2
 Some researchers discover that tax factors eclipse financial reporting 
considerations. For example, Manzon (1992) finds that, to minimize the cost of the 
alternative minimum tax (AMT), firms facing high MTRs engaged in downward 
earnings management to a greater extent than companies with low MTRs, and this result 
is robust to the inclusion of controls for financial reporting incentives. Guenther, 
Maydew, and Nutter (1997) report that, in response to mandatory adoption of the accrual 
basis for taxable income determination, former cash-basis taxpayers deferred book 
income to preserve tax savings. 
Other studies provide evidence that financial reporting concerns dominate tax 
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savings. For instance, Maydew, Schipper, and Vincent (1999) show that, in structuring 
divestitures of assets as either taxable sales or tax-free spin-offs, companies willingly 
incur taxes to increase book income and cash flows. Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew 
(2004) demonstrate that their sample of restatement firms reported overstated book 
income, included these inflated profits on their tax returns, and thus overpaid their taxes 
to preserve financial reporting benefits. 
Other papers establish that tax and financial reporting factors jointly impact 
firms’ business decisions. Francis and Reiter (1987) find that (1) firms with high MTRs 
reduce their tax liabilities by overfunding their pension plans and deducting these plan 
contributions and (2) companies with restrictive debt covenants reduce book expenses by 
underfunding their pension plans and thus avoiding technical default. Guenther (1994) 
reports that the corporate tax rate reduction included in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
(TRA1986) motivated firms to defer income to lower-tax years, but firms facing higher 
financial reporting costs (proxied by the ratio of long-term debt to total assets) deferred 
less income. Maydew (1997) also uses TRA86 as a natural experimental setting and 
provides evidence that (1) firms with net operating loss (NOL) carrybacks deferred 
income and accelerated expenses to enlarge tax refunds in high-tax years and (2) this 
intertemporal income shifting was increasing in the associated tax benefits and 
decreasing in the related financial reporting costs. 
Overall, the extant literature examining tax and financial reporting tradeoffs 
reveals that both factors impact firms’ business decisions and that neither incentive 
consistently prevails. Thus, additional research in alternative settings is warranted. 
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Firms coordinate financial reporting and tax considerations in their inventory 
accounting decisions.
3
 With respect to the last-in, first-out (LIFO) inventory valuation 
method, studies have investigated firms’ decisions to adopt LIFO (Biddle 1980, Morse 
and Richardson 1983, Lee and Hsieh 1985, Dopuch and Pincus 1988, Lee and Petruzzi 
1989, and Cushing and LeClere 1992) and companies’ choices to abandon this method 
(Morse and Richardson 1983, Johnson and Dhaliwal 1988, and Sweeney 1994). These 
papers consistently report that tax savings play a significant role in firms’ selections of 
inventory valuation methods. 
Prior research also has investigated the factors underlying firms’ decisions to 
liquidate and replenish LIFO inventory layers. Cohen and Halperin (1980) and Biddle 
and Martin (1985) develop analytical models that predict LIFO firms’ intra-year 
purchase/production decisions and end-of-year inventory levels. Davis, Kahn, and Rozen 
(1984), Cottell (1986), and Dhaliwal, Frankel, and Trezevant (1994) demonstrate that tax 
costs discourage LIFO liquidations, financial reporting benefits encourage LIFO 
liquidations, and both the likelihood and size of LIFO liquidations by low-tax firms 
exceed those for high-tax companies. Bowen and Pfeiffer (1989) and Frankel and 
Trezevant (1994) examine firms’ choices to replace liquidated LIFO layers and discover 
that tax costs associated with LIFO liquidations stimulate companies to 
purchase/produce additional inventory at yearend, despite the negative financial 
reporting consequences of this action. Hunt, Moyer, and Shevlin (1996) employ a 
simultaneous equations methodology to determine if LIFO firms adjust discretionary 
accounts (inventory, other current accruals, and depreciation expense) to reach corporate 
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goals (smooth income, reduce debt-related costs, and minimize taxes); their results 
indicate that LIFO firms sacrifice tax benefits to achieve the other two objectives. 
None of the studies cited previously acknowledges that LIFO firms engaging in 
manufacturing enjoy another earnings management option in addition to LIFO layer 
liquidations and replacements. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
mandate that manufacturing firms use absorption costing to value their inventories for 
financial reporting purposes. Under absorption costing, fixed manufacturing costs (such 
as depreciation expense related to manufacturing facilities and equipment) attach to 
products. These fixed manufacturing costs reside in inventory until firms sell their 
products, at which point these costs flow to COGS. Thus, holding sales constant, as 
manufacturing firms increase production, the amount of fixed costs included in 
inventory rises, the amount included in COGS falls, and, consequently, income 
increases. This technique also functions in reverse: as production slows, the value of 
inventory falls, COGS rises, and earnings decline. Accordingly, manufacturing firms can 
manage their earnings by manipulating their production. Cook, Huston, and Kinney 
(2007) refer to this strategy as the “production lever” and demonstrate that LIFO firms 
that engage in manufacturing face friction in the use of production to manage their 
earnings because the production lever requires inventory increases to boost earnings, 
whereas LIFO liquidations necessitate inventory decreases to enhance income. With the 
exception of Cook et al. (2007), the extant LIFO literature neither acknowledges the 
production lever effect nor examines this friction by segregating manufacturing firms 
from the remainder of the LIFO sample. 
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In this chapter, I exclude LIFO firms from my sample for three reasons. First, in 
2005 (the most recent year in my sample period), the Compustat universe includes only 
66 firms that use LIFO as their exclusive inventory valuation method (data59=2); of 
these 66 companies, 41 engage in manufacturing (2000<=dnum<4000). In contrast, 
2,037 firms apply the first-in, first-out (FIFO) method (data59=1) in 2005, and 1,357 of 
these companies report manufacturing SIC codes. Thus, LIFO firms constitute a small 
percentage of my potential sample of manufacturing firms. Second, as I noted in the 
previous paragraph, LIFO firms face a tradeoff between overproduction and the 
liquidation of LIFO layers in managing their earnings upward; this friction does not 
affect FIFO firms. Third, for LIFO firms, examining the impact of tax and financial 
reporting incentives on production decisions requires quarterly LIFO reserve data 
because a change in the LIFO reserve leads to a corresponding change in COGS. 
Because LIFO reserve data are not readily available on a quarterly basis, I remove these 
companies from my sample. 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) survey more than 400 financial 
executives, question whether these managers would engage in actions with real 
economic consequences (hereafter, real activities management) to meet earnings 
benchmarks, and report results consistent with this behavior. For example, 79.9 percent 
of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that they would decrease discretionary 
spending on items such as research and development (R&D) or advertising to hit 
earnings targets. One form of real activities management that researchers have 
empirically investigated is overproduction. As explained previously, manufacturing 
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firms can manipulate production to manage earnings upward or downward by shifting 
fixed production costs to inventory accounts or to COGS, respectively. Jiambalvo, 
Noreen, and Shevlin (1997) investigate the relation between security returns and the 
earnings component generated by overproduction and find that (1) the market generally 
views overproduction as “good news” (that is, a leading indicator of strong future 
performance) but (2) the market discounts this good news for firms that overproduce to 
smooth earnings. Thomas and Zhang (2002) also proffer earnings management as an 
explanation for their observed negative correlation between current inventory changes 
and future returns. 
More recent studies have directly investigated the use of production manipulation 
to manage earnings. Roychowdhury (2006) finds that manufacturing firms report higher 
unexpected production costs than companies in other industries during years in which 
earnings management is suspected (that is, years in which income narrowly exceeds 
target levels). In their studies investigating how firms coordinate various earnings 
management techniques (within-GAAP versus non-GAAP, accrual manipulation versus 
real activities management), Badertscher (2007) and Zang (2006) also provide evidence 
that firms overproduce inventory to lower COGS and augment reported earnings. Cook 
et al. (2007) document that (1) a systematic association exists between firms’ inventory 
changes and their financial reporting incentives and (2) this association varies with the 
proportions of fixed manufacturing costs in these companies’ cost structures and their 
choices of inventory valuation methods. These studies largely ignore the impact of taxes 
on firms’ willingness to manage their financial earnings by manipulating production. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to extend the tax and financial reporting tradeoff literature 
by examining how taxes impact manufacturing firms’ production decisions in the 
presence of financial reporting incentives. 
Motivation and Hypotheses 
Manufacturing firms with earnings above their target levels (“beat firms”) may 
use discretionary inventory decreases to reduce their income and build “cookie jar” 
reserves.
4
 In contrast, manufacturing firms with earnings below their target levels (“miss 
firms”) may use discretionary inventory increases to boost their income and potentially 
reach their goals. Hypotheses 1A and 1B formalize these expectations:
5, 6 
H1A: Beat firms make discretionary inventory decreases to lower reported financial 
earnings. 
H1B: Miss firms make discretionary inventory increases to raise reported financial 
earnings. 
Firms managing book income downward by decelerating production (relative to 
sales) receive a tax benefit from this strategy by simultaneously decreasing their taxable 
income. For these companies, no tradeoff exists between tax and financial reporting 
factors; rather, these incentives align. In contrast, one cost of managing income upward 
by accelerating production (relative to sales) is the tax liability that the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) levies on these additional profits. Thus, as their tax burdens increase, 
manufacturing firms that miss their income goals absent overproduction may limit their 
use of this earnings enhancement strategy. These companies must weigh the tax cost and 
financial reporting benefit (that is, the possibility of reaching their earnings targets) of 
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this technique, and which consideration dominates in this scenario is ripe for empirical 
investigation. Since discretionary production decisions affect firms’ earnings at the 
margin, I use MTRs to proxy for the tax costs and benefits associated with under- or 
overproduction. Hypotheses 2A, 2B, and 2C express my predictions (presuming that 
taxes impact this business decision): 
H2A: Beat firms make larger discretionary inventory decreases as their MTRs increase. 
H2B: Relative to beat firms, the influence of MTRs on miss firms’ discretionary 
production decisions is muted. 
H2C: Miss firms make smaller discretionary inventory increases as their MTRs 
increase. 
Tax considerations may also impact the timing of firms’ production decisions. 
Specifically, companies face incentives to reduce taxable income in the fourth quarter, 
relative to the first three quarters of the year, for purposes of determining the current 
year’s tax liability (or refund) and the subsequent year’s estimated tax payments. With 
respect to the current year’s tax burden, firms that have overproduced (relative to sales) 
to hit their earnings targets in the first three quarters of the year may limit or reverse this 
strategy in the fourth quarter in anticipation of filing IRS Form 1120, thereby reducing 
the liability (or increasing the refund) reported on these tax returns. With respect to the 
subsequent year’s estimated tax payments, companies that meet four criteria (prior tax 
year was 12 months, filed a tax return in the prior year, did not report a tax liability in 
the prior year, and had less than $1 million of taxable income in each of the prior three 
years) do not incur underpayment penalties in the subsequent year if the sum of their 
  
97 
9
7
 
estimated tax payments in that year equal or exceed their total tax in the current year. For 
firms that fail to meet these conditions, the IRS will not assess underpayment penalties if 
the sum of estimated tax payments in the current year equals or exceeds that year’s total 
tax. Under either scenario, corporations face stronger incentives in the fourth quarter to 
reduce their taxable income than they confront in the first three quarters.
7
 For firms that 
exceed their income goals without manipulating production, this tax timing incentive 
suggests more downward earnings management in the fourth quarter. However, for firms 
that miss their earnings targets absent discretionary income changes, this tax motivation 
implies less upward earnings management in the fourth quarter. Again, for miss firms, 
determining whether tax timing concerns overshadow financial reporting considerations 
in this setting is an empirical question. Hypotheses 3A, 3B, and 3C articulate my 
expectations (assuming that taxes matter): 
H3A: Beat firms make larger discretionary inventory decreases in the fourth quarter 
relative to the first three quarters. 
H3B: Relative to beat firms, the influence of tax timing on miss firms’ discretionary 
production decisions is muted. 
H3C: Miss firms make smaller discretionary inventory increases in the fourth quarter 
relative to the first three quarters. 
Data and Methodology 
My initial sample contains 934,489 firm-quarter observations from the 
Compustat Industrial Quarterly database for the years 1988 through 2005. I begin my 
sample period in 1988, following the last significant restructuring of the Internal 
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Revenue Code (TRA86), so that the tax structure is relatively stable during the sample 
period.
8
 To explore the manipulation of production to manage earnings, I limit my 
sample to manufacturing firms; thus, I eliminate 607,734 observations for non-
manufacturing companies with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes less than 
2000 or greater than 3999. I remove 280,487 observations that lack required quarterly 
financial statement data from Compustat and 26,257 observations that report no 
inventories, fail to report inventory valuation methods, or use methods other than FIFO 
to value their inventories.
9
 I eliminate non-FIFO firms because I cannot anticipate how 
alternate inventory valuation methods, such as specific identification and average cost, 
impact companies’ incentives to manage earnings through discretionary inventory 
changes. I also discard 6,437 observations that lack MTR data from John Graham’s 
website (http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/) and 7,258 observations that lack 
forecasted and actual earnings data from I/B/E/S. These cuts yield a final sample of 
6,316 firm-quarter observations representing 758 unique firms. The mean and median 
quarters of data per firm are 8.33 and 5, respectively. Table IV-1 presents the sample 
screening process that I use to determine this final sample size. 
To test my hypotheses, I use a two-stage regression procedure. In the first stage, I 
develop Model (IV-1) to purge firms’ total quarterly inventory changes of the non-
discretionary component associated with current sales, future demand, and firm- and 
year-specific factors. The residuals from this model represent firms’ quarterly 
discretionary inventory changes, which I presume relate in part to tax and financial 
reporting incentives. I provide Compustat quarterly variable numbers in parentheses:
  
9
9
 
Table IV-1: Chapter IV Sample Size Derivation  
    
Initial firm-quarter observations from the Compustat Industrial Quarterly database for years 1988-2005 934,489  
Less:   
 Non-manufacturing firm-quarter observations (dnum<2000 or dnum>=4000) (607,734) 
 Firm-quarter observations that lack inventory, fail to report an inventory valuation method, or use a non-FIFO method (data59^=1) (26,257) 
 Firm-quarter observations that lack sufficient data from the following databases to calculate required variables:  
  Compustat Industrial Quarterly (280,487) 
  John Graham's marginal tax rate website (6,437) 
  Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S) (7,258) 
Final sample size 6,316  
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Inv_chi,q =  + 1 Sal_chi,q + 2 Fut_demi,q+1 + 3 Fut_demi,q+2 + 4 
Fut_demi,q+3 + 5-761 Firm Indicatorsi + 762-777 Year Indicatorsy + 
i,q, where (IV-1) 
Inv_chi,q = inventoriesi,q (data38) – inventoriesi,q-1 
Sal_chi,q = salesi,q (data2) – salesi,q-1 
Fut_demi,q+1 = salesi,q+1 – salesi,q 
Fut_demi,q+2 = salesi,q+2 – salesi,q+1 
Fut_demi,q+3 = salesi,q+3 – salesi,q+2 
The response variable, Inv_ch, measures sample firms’ total inventory changes 
during the current quarter. Sal_ch captures sales changes occurring contemporaneously 
with Inv_ch, and Fut_dem represents sales changes occurring in the three subsequent 
quarters (proxies for managers’ expectations of future demand for their firms’ products). 
If companies strive to maintain a constant ratio of inventory to sales in order to avoid 
excess carrying costs and stock outages, a positive relation should exist between Inv_ch 
and Sal_ch. However, if increases in sales draw down inventory (or decreases in sales 
build up inventory) without offsetting adjustments to production, a negative association 
should manifest between Inv_ch and Sal_ch. Thus, I place no directional prediction on 
this variable. In contrast, assuming that firms modify their production in anticipation of 
future changes in demand, I expect a direct association between Inv_ch and Fut_dem. I 
include in Model (IV-1) proxies for future demand in the next three quarters because 
companies’ production decisions in the current quarter may relate to anticipated sales 
over various time horizons. For example, a calendar-year toy manufacturer may produce 
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dolls during the first quarter in anticipation of holiday sales in the fourth quarter of the 
same year. A calendar-year automobile manufacturer may build cars in the fourth quarter 
in anticipation of summer sales in the second and third quarters of the following year. I 
winsorize the continuous variables in Model (IV-1) at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles to 
reduce the influence of outlying observations and employ a two-way fixed effects 
approach that controls for firm- and year-specific factors that influence firms’ inventory 
changes but may not relate to tax or financial reporting considerations.
10
 I label the 
residuals from this estimation Disc_inv_ch, a measure of firms’ discretionary inventory 
changes. Table IV-2 provides definitions of all variables that I use in this chapter. 
For a firm that uses the FIFO inventory valuation method, the following equation 
captures the earnings effect of a discretionary inventory change:
 
Earn_effi,q = Disc_inv_chi,q • FCRi,q, where 
Disc_inv_chi,q = the residual from Model (IV-1) 
FCRi,q = property, plant, and equipmenti,q (data42) / assetsi,q 
This equation demonstrates that, as a FIFO firm alters its level of production (for 
a constant level of sales), a corresponding change in income occurs. As Cook et al. 
(2007) demonstrate, the potency of this earnings management strategy depends on the 
firm’s cost structure. As the proportion of fixed manufacturing costs in the firm’s cost 
structure (the fixed-cost ratio, FCR) increases, the earnings effect of a discretionary 
inventory change also increases. 
In the second stage, I construct Model (IV-2) to evaluate whether and to what 
extent tax and financial reporting considerations influence the earnings effects of firms’ 
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Table IV-2. Chapter IV Variable Definitions 
  
Inv_chi,q total inventory change: inventoriesi,q (data38) - inventoriesi,q-1 
Sal_chi,q sales change: salesi,q (data2) - salesi,q-1 
Fut_demi,q+1 future demand one quarter ahead: salesi,q+1 - salesi,q 
Fut_demi,q+2 future demand two quarters ahead: salesi,q+2 - salesi,q+1 
Fut_demi,q+3 future demand three quarters ahead: salesi,q+3 - salesi,q+2 
Disc_inv_chi,q discretionary inventory change: residual from Model (1) 
FCRi,q fixed cost ratio: property, plant, and equipmenti,q (data42) / assetsi,q (data44) 
Earn_effi,q earnings effect of discretionary inventory change: Disc_inv_chi,q • FCRi,q 
Earn_eff_assi,q Earn_effi,q / assetsi,q 
ETRiq effective tax rate: income taxesi,q (data6) / pretax incomei,q (data23) 
Forecasti,q forecasted earnings: the last I/B/E/S consensus forecast estimatei,q (meanest) * common shares used to calculate EPSi,q (data54) / (1 - ETRi,q) 
Actuali,q actual earnings: I/B/E/S actual EPSi,q (value) * common shares used to calculate EPSi,q / (1 - ETRi,q) 
Premani,q pre-managed earnings: Actuali,q - Earn_effi,q 
Missi,q an indicator variable coded 1 if Forecasti,q exceeds Premani,q, and 0 otherwise 
MTRi,y-1 lagged marginal tax ratei,y-1 based on income after deducting interest expense  
Timeq an indicator variable coded 1 if quarterq is the fourth quarter of the year, and 0 otherwise 
LRi,q-1 lagged leverage ratio: liabilitiesi,q-1 (data54) / assetsi,q-1 
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discretionary inventory changes: 
Earn_eff_assi,q =  + 1 Missi,q + 2 MTRi,y-1 + 3 Missi,q • MTRi,y-1 + 4 Timeq + 
5 Missi,q • Timeq + 6 LRi,q-1 + 7 Missi,q • LRi,q-1 +  
i,q, where (IV-2) 
Earn_eff_assi,q = Earn_effi,q / assetsi,q 
Missi,q = an indicator variable coded 1 if firm i misses its income target in 
quarter q absent the earnings effect of its discretionary inventory 
change, and 0 otherwise 
MTRi,y-1 = lagged marginal tax ratei,y-1 based on earnings after deducting 
interest expense 
Timeq = an indicator variable coded 1 if quarter q is the fourth quarter of 
the year, and 0 otherwise 
LR i,q-1 = liabilitiesi,q-1 (data54) / assetsi,q-1 (data44) 
The response variable, Earn_eff_ass, measures the earnings effect of sample 
firms’ discretionary inventory changes, scaled by total assets to control for firm size.11 
The indicator variable Miss captures firms’ financial reporting incentives. Appendix B 
details the calculation of Miss. This variable assumes that companies with premanaged 
earnings (that is, actual earnings less the earnings effect of discretionary inventory 
changes) that fail to reach their consensus analyst forecasts possess an incentive to boost 
their income. Graham et al. (2005) report that 73.5 percent of executives in their survey 
list the consensus analyst forecast as an important earnings benchmark. Brown and 
Caylor (2005) find that, over time, stockholders value companies’ abilities to meet or 
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beat their consensus analyst forecasts more than they reward these firms for avoiding 
losses and negative quarterly earnings surprises. Matsunaga and Park (2001) also 
discover that missing consensus analyst forecasts negatively impacts CEOs’ annual 
bonuses. In keeping with H1A, I expect a negative coefficient for the intercept ( ), 
indicating that beat firms decrease production, thereby decreasing their reported 
financial earnings and creating “cookie jar” reserves. Consistent with H1B, I predict a 
positive sum of the intercept and the coefficient for the Miss main effect ( + 1), 
implying that miss firms increase production, thereby raising their reported financial 
earnings and potentially reaching their income goals. 
The continuous variable MTR captures firms’ tax incentives related to tax rates. 
Since the earnings effects of firms’ discretionary inventory changes indirectly influence 
their MTRs by modifying their taxable income, an endogenous relationship exists 
between contemporaneous measures of Earn_eff_ass and MTR; thus, I use one-year 
lagged values of MTR in Model (IV-2).
12
 In keeping with H2A, I expect a negative 
coefficient for the MTR main effect ( 2), indicating that beat firms make larger 
discretionary inventory decreases as their MTRs rise. As H2B predicts, I anticipate a 
positive coefficient for the interaction of Miss with MTR ( 3) because, unlike beat firms, 
miss firms face friction between their tax rate and financial reporting incentives. 
Consistent with H2C, I predict a negative sum of the coefficients for MTR and the 
interaction of Miss with MTR ( 2+ 3), implying that miss firms make smaller 
discretionary inventory increases as their MTRs rise. However, if the sum of 2 and 3 
does not differ significantly from zero, this result provides evidence that higher tax rates 
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do not deter miss firms from overproducing to increase their book income. 
The indicator variable Time captures firms’ tax incentives associated with tax 
timing.
13
 In keeping with H3A, I expect a negative coefficient for the Time main effect 
( 4), indicating that beat firms make larger discretionary inventory decreases in the 
fourth quarter relative to the first three quarters. As H3B predicts, I anticipate a positive 
coefficient for the interaction of Miss with Time ( 5) because miss firms possess 
financial reporting considerations that diminish the benefit of tax timing whereas these 
motivations ally for beat companies. Consistent with H3C, I predict a negative sum of 
the coefficients for Time and the interaction of Miss with Time ( 4+ 5), implying that 
miss firms make smaller discretionary inventory increases in the fourth quarter relative 
to the first three quarters. Again, if the sum of 4 and 5 does not differ significantly 
from zero, this finding indicates that the incentives to minimize the current year’s tax 
liability (or maximize the refund), avoid an underpayment penalty, and minimize the 
subsequent year’s estimated tax payments do not overwhelm the desire to improve 
earnings in the fourth quarter. 
LR measures firms’ ratios of total liabilities to total assets. If companies assume 
debt to finance their purchases of materials used to generate additional inventory, the 
balance-sheet ratios that lenders specify in debt covenants likely worsen. Thus, I include 
LR as a control variable and anticipate a negative correlation between this variable and 
Earn_eff_ass, implying that leverage constraints encourage underproduction. I also 
interact Miss with LR because the enticement of reaching or exceeding their earnings 
targets may differentially impact the relation between debt covenants and production 
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decisions for miss firms relative to beat companies. Since firms’ discretionary inventory 
changes directly impact both the numerator and denominator of their leverage ratios, an 
endogenous relationship exists between contemporaneous measures of Earn_eff_ass and 
LR; thus, I use one-quarter lagged values of LR in Model (IV-2). As in Model (IV-1), I 
winsorize the continuous variables in Model (IV-2) at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles to limit 
the impact of outliers.
14 
Results 
Table IV-3, Panels A, B, and C present descriptive statistics, correlation 
coefficients, and regression coefficients related to Model (IV-1). In Panel B, the 
correlation between Inv_ch and Sal_ch is negative and significant, indicating that firms 
allow their inventories to shrink as sales increase (and swell as sales decrease) rather 
than sustaining a stable ratio between these variables. The strongest association in this 
panel exists between Inv_ch and one-quarter-ahead Fut_dem, implying that companies’ 
inventory levels in the current quarter are primarily influenced by anticipated demand in 
the near term. However, the correlation between Inv_ch and three-quarter-ahead 
Fut_dem is also positive and significant, implying that longer-term product demand also 
affects managers’ current production decisions. 
In Panel C, I report the results of estimating Model (IV-1). The coefficient on 
Sal_ch is insignificant. However, the coefficients on Fut_dem in each of the subsequent 
three quarters are positive and significant, suggesting that inventory levels in the current 
quarter reflect managers’ expectations of customers’ demand for their products in the 
next three quarters. The condition index for Model (IV-1) is 1.51; thus, multicollinearity 
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Table IV-3. Descriptive Statistics, Correlation Coefficients, and Regression Coefficients for Model (IV-1)  
         
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics       
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum 
Inv_chi,q 6,316 2.2146 15.7600 -58.2740 -0.8025 0.5695 3.2965 84.9290 
Sal_chi,q 6,316 8.3183 55.5271 -208.7890 -1.1725 1.5500 7.6680 313.2999 
Fut_demi,q+1 6,316 9.3799 55.0077 -177.9680 -1.2235 1.6155 8.1755 317.8389 
Fut_demi,q+2 6,316 10.1140 57.7650 -178.9780 -1.3020 1.6790 8.5810 336.1510 
Fut_demi,q+3 6,316 9.6360 60.1764 -197.2300 -1.6175 1.5989 8.5940 341.2049 
         
I winsorize all variables at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.      
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Table IV-3. Continued    
    
Panel B. Correlation Coefficients with Inv_chi,q  
Variable Prediction Correlation Coefficient 
Sal_chi,q ? -0.0697 *** 
Fut_demi,q+1 + 0.4162 *** 
Fut_demi,q+2 + 0.0082  
Fut_demi,q+3 + 0.0554 *** 
    
*** The correlation coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level.  
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Table IV-3. Continued    
    
Model (IV-1): Inv_chi,q =  + 1 Sal_chi,q + 2 Fut_demi,q+1 + 3 Fut_demi,q+2 + 
4 Fut_demi,q+3 + 5-761 Firm Indicatorsi +  
                    762-777 Year Indicatorsy + i,q   
Panel C. Regression Coefficients   
Variable Prediction Regression Coefficient 
Intercept ? 6.1222  
Sal_chi,q ? 0.0029  
Fut_demi,q+1 + 0.1160 *** 
Fut_demi,q+2 + 0.0130 *** 
Fut_demi,q+3 + 0.0097 *** 
    
Observations 6,316   
Condition Index 1.51   
R
2
 26.84%   
    
*** The regression coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level.  
I estimate these regression coefficients using a two-way fixed effects model. 
I omit firm and year indicator variables from the table for 
concision. 
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does not appear to impact these regression results. The R
2
 statistic for Model (IV-1) is 
26.84 percent, meaning that the independent variables in the model explain more than a 
quarter of the variation in Inv_ch. An F test (untabulated) also reveals that the firm and 
year indicator variables contribute significant explanatory power to the model. 
Table IV-4, Panels A, B, and C present descriptive statistics, correlation 
coefficients, and regression coefficients related to Model (IV-2). Given that my 
expectations differ depending on whether firms miss or beat their quarterly earnings 
benchmarks, I partition Panels A and B according to the indicator variable Miss and 
display separate results for each sub-sample of firm-quarter observations. For my 
sample, 4,168 observations (65.99 percent) report pre-managed earnings equal to or in 
excess of their consensus analyst forecasts, and 2,148 observations (34.01 percent) fail to 
reach their income targets absent discretionary inventory changes. In Panel A, both the 
mean and median values for Earn_eff_ass are negative for beat firms (Miss=0) and 
positive for miss firms (Miss=1). These statistics provide univariate support for H1A and 
H1B; on average, manufacturing firms that exceed their quarterly income targets absent 
discretionary inventory changes cut production (relative to sales) and lower their 
reported financial earnings, while companies that miss their income goals without 
manipulating production add to their inventories and boost their profits. 
In Panel B, the correlations between Earn_eff_ass and both MTR and Time are 
negative and significant for the beat sub-sample, providing initial support for H2A and 
H3A. That is, beat firms appear to make larger discretionary inventory decreases as (1) 
their MTRs increase and (2) in the fourth quarter relative to the first three quarters. For 
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Table IV-4. Descriptive Statistics, Correlation Coefficients, and Regression Coefficients for Model (IV-2)  
         
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics       
Missi,q=0         
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum 
Earn_eff_assi,q 4,168 -0.0023 0.0051 -0.0229 -0.0035 -0.0009 0.0002 0.0148 
MTRi,y-1 4,168 0.2735 0.1330 0.0000 0.2900 0.3400 0.3500 0.3802 
Timeq 4,168 0.2687 0.4433 0 0 0 1 1 
LRi,q-1 4,168 0.3823 0.1995 0.0591 0.2158 0.3618 0.5219 0.9523 
         
Missi,q=1         
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum 
Earn_eff_assi,q 2,148 0.0024 0.0044 -0.0229 0.0001 0.0015 0.0042 0.0148 
MTRi,y-1 2,148 0.2852 0.1247 0.0000 0.3249 0.3400 0.3500 0.3802 
Timeq 2,148 0.2118 0.4087 0 0 0 0 1 
LRi,q-1 2,148 0.3691 0.1941 0.0591 0.2130 0.3467 0.5000 0.9523 
         
I winsorize all continuous variables at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.     
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Table IV-4. Continued    
    
Panel B. Correlation Coefficients with Earn_eff_assi,q  
Missi,q=0    
Variable Prediction Correlation Coefficient 
MTRi,y-1 - -0.0658 *** 
Timeq - -0.0940 *** 
LRi,q-1 - -0.0567 *** 
    
Missi,q=1    
Variable Prediction Correlation Coefficient 
MTRi,y-1 - 0.0089  
Timeq - -0.0421 ** 
LRi,q-1 - 0.0005  
    
*** The correlation coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level.  
** The correlation coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level.  
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Table IV-4. Continued    
    
Model (IV-2): Earn_eff_assi,q =  + 1 Missi,q + 2 MTRi,y-1 + 3 Missi,q • MTRi,y-1 + 
                    4 Timeq + 5 Missi,q • Timeq + 6 LRi,q-1 + 7 Missi,q • LRi,q-1 + i,q 
Panel C. Regression Coefficients   
Variable Prediction Regression Coefficient 
Intercept - -0.00062 *** 
Missi,q + 0.00307 *** 
MTRi,y-1 - -0.00279 *** 
Missi,q • MTRi,y-1 + 0.00311 *** 
Timeq - -0.00107 *** 
Missi,q • Timeq + 0.00061 ** 
LRi,q-1 - -0.00160 *** 
Missi,q • LRi,q-1 + 0.00158 *** 
    
Observations 6,316   
Condition Index 13.27   
R
2
 18.30%   
    
Tests for Sums of Regression Coefficients   
Variables Prediction Sum of Coefficients 
Intercept + Missi,q + 0.00245 *** 
MTRi,y-1 + Missi,q • MTRi,y-1 - 0.00032  
Timeq + Missi,q • Timeq - -0.00046 ** 
LRi,q-1 + Missi,q • LRi,q-1 - -0.00002  
    
*** The coefficient or sum of coefficients is significant at the 0.01 level. 
** The coefficient or sum of coefficients is significant at the 0.05 level.  
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miss firms, the association between Earn_eff_ass and MTR is insignificant, lending no 
support for H2C; however, the correlation between Earn_eff_ass and Time is negative 
and significant, bolstering H3C. Note that the association between Earn_eff_ass and 
Time is smaller in magnitude (and statistically weaker) for the miss sub-sample relative 
to the beat sub-sample. These bivariate correlation coefficients demonstrate that tax and 
financial reporting incentives align for beat firms but create friction for miss firms. 
The regression results in Panel C provide multivariate support for the conclusions 
drawn from the bivariate correlations in Panel B. Specifically, the negative coefficient 
for the intercept and the positive sum of the coefficients for the intercept and Miss imply 
that beat firms use inventory decreases to manage their earnings downward and create 
“cookie jar” reserves, while miss firms manage their earnings upward and potentially hit 
their income targets; these findings support H1A and H1B. The negative coefficients for 
MTR and Time indicate that, for beat firms, tax and financial reporting incentives work 
in unison, encouraging these companies to underproduce inventory (relative to sales) to 
reduce both tax and book income; these results bolster H2A and H3A. In contrast, the 
positive coefficients for the interactions of Miss with both MTR and Time suggest that, 
for miss firms, tension exists between tax and financial reporting factors and that, 
relative to beat companies, the negative influences of tax rates and timing on the 
earnings effects of discretionary inventory changes are suppressed. This evidence 
substantiates H2B and H3B. 
By adding the coefficients on (1) MTR and Miss • MTR and (2) Time and Miss • 
Time, I test the relative importance of tax and financial reporting incentives for miss 
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firms. The sum of MTR and Miss • MTR is insignificant, implying that, contrary to H2C, 
higher tax rates (and the associated tax burdens) imposed on the additional income 
generated by overproducing (relative to sales) do not discourage miss firms from 
enhancing their income in an effort to reach earnings benchmarks. However, consistent 
with H3C, the sum of Time and Miss • Time is negative and significant, revealing that 
miss firms sacrifice book income to lower taxable income in the fourth quarter. The 
coefficient on the LR main effect is negative and significant, suggesting that leverage 
constraints compel beat firms to cut production, while the sum of the coefficients on LR 
and the interaction of Miss and LR is insignificant, evidence that potential debt covenant 
violations do not dissuade miss firms from augmenting their profits through 
discretionary inventory increases. The condition index of 13.27 for Model (IV-2) 
indicates that multicollinearity does not severely influence these regression results. 
Conclusion and Future Research 
This chapter demonstrates that manufacturing firms manipulate production to 
manage earnings and examines whether tax incentives magnify or temper this strategy. 
Companies that exceed their quarterly consensus analyst forecasts absent the earnings 
effects of discretionary inventory changes cut production (relative to sales), creating an 
earnings “cookie jar” for future quarters. For this sub-sample, tax and financial reporting 
incentives are aligned; thus, these companies make larger discretionary inventory 
decreases (1) as their MTRs rise and (2) in the fourth quarter relative to the first three 
quarters. In contrast, the sub-sample of firms that miss their income goals without 
manipulating production use discretionary inventory increases to enhance their earnings 
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and potentially reach their benchmarks. For these companies, friction exists between tax 
and financial reporting incentives. Results indicate that higher tax rates do not impede 
miss firms from managing their earnings upward; however, tax timing considerations 
dissuade these companies from opportunistically manipulating production in the fourth 
quarter. 
Future research may investigate (both cross-sectionally and inter-temporally) 
why some firms respond to tax incentives while others react to financial reporting 
concerns. For companies that link their managers’ compensation plans to accounting 
income or stock price (via performance-based bonuses or stock options), I predict that 
maximizing book earnings supersedes minimizing taxable income. On the contrary, for 
firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms, I expect that earnings management 
is less prevalent. Legal and regulatory changes may also influence the tradeoff between 
tax and financial reporting incentives across time. For example, the corporate tax rate 
reductions included in TRA86 diminished the benefits of minimizing taxes for 
companies with high taxable income. Similarly, increased scrutiny of financial 
statements (and harsher penalties for transgressions) following passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) may reduce firms’ willingness to manipulate book income. 
Notes 
1. Kothari (2001) and Holthausen and Watts (2001) provide thorough reviews of the 
literature examining the relationship between accounting earnings and stock price. 
2. Shackelford and Shevlin (2001, 326-338) provide a thorough review of the 
literature examining the tradeoffs between tax and financial reporting. 
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3. Jenkins and Pincus (1998) provide a thorough review of the literature examining 
firms’ choices of inventory valuation methods. 
4. In this context, the creation of “cookie jar” reserves implies that underproduction 
relative to demand in the current period permits overproduction relative to demand 
in a future period, granting the firm the associated earnings improvement in that 
future period. 
5. This strategy involves costs. If a manufacturing firm increases production to boost 
income, the company incurs carrying costs (storage, insurance, property taxes, etc.) 
for the unsold units and may suffer inventory obsolescence. In contrast, if a 
manufacturing firm decreases production to reduce income, the business may 
experience stock outages and order backlogs (and the associated reputational 
effects). If firms only engage in this form of earnings management to the extent 
that the tax and/or financial reporting benefits exceed these costs, the presence of 
such costs biases against discovering my hypothesized results. 
6. I assume that managers realize that their firms’ earnings will either beat or miss 
their income goals with sufficient time to modify production accordingly. 
7. The IRS also permits firms that fail to meet the four conditions to base their 
estimated tax payments on annualized income; that is, they may determine the 
amount of their quarterly payments according to the taxable income earned through 
the month before the month in which the payment is due (for example, firms use 
taxable income earned through May to calculate the estimated tax payment due on 
June 15). For these companies, the tax costs and benefits of manipulating 
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production occur uniformly throughout the four quarters. The presence of firms in 
my sample that use the annualization approach biases against discovering my 
hypothesized results related to tax timing. 
8. TRA86 reduced the top statutory tax rate for corporations from 46 percent in 1986 
to 40 percent in 1987 and again to 34 percent in 1988. The Revenue Reconciliation 
Tax Act of 1993 (RRTA93) raised this rate slightly to 35 percent. 
9. For some firms, Compustat reports multiple-digit values for data59, signifying that 
these companies use more than one method to value their inventories. For these 
firms, Compustat lists the methods in the order of the relative amount of inventory 
valued by each method. The reduce noise, I include in my sample only firms with 
single-digit values for data59. 
10. The results of estimating Models (IV-1) and (IV-2) are qualitatively unaltered if I 
replace firm indicator variables in Model (IV-1) with industry indicator variables 
based on two-digit SIC codes. 
11. The results of estimating Model (IV-2) are qualitatively unaltered if I use Earn_eff 
(unscaled) as the response variable and include the natural logarithm of assets as an 
explanatory variable to control for firm size. 
12. During my sample period, the average change in MTR from one year to the next 
was less than one percent for the majority of firms in John Graham’s MTR 
database. Given that MTRs are relatively stable across time, I assume that firms’ 
actual MTRs in the previous year represent their anticipated MTRs in the current 
year. Since John Graham provides MTR data on an annual basis, I apply the one-
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year lagged MTR values to all quarters in the current year. 
13. The Time variable may capture timing effects unrelated to taxes. For example, 
since most sample firms have December 31 fiscal yearends, increased sales during 
the holiday shopping season may draw down inventories, and the associated 
negative inventory changes during the fourth quarter may engender a timing effect. 
However, Model (IV-1) purges firms’ total inventory changes of the component 
driven by contemporaneous sales changes. As a sensitivity test, I re-estimate 
Model (IV-2) for sub-samples of firms with December 31 fiscal yearends (3,529 
observations, 55.87 percent) and those with fiscal years ending in other months 
(2,787 observations, 44.13 percent). The results of these estimations are 
qualitatively equivalent to those for the pooled sample of 6,316 observations. 
14. The results of estimating Model (IV-2) are qualitatively unaltered if I include firm 
(or industry) and year indicator variables. However, I specifically exclude these 
explanatory variables from Model (IV-2) because Model (IV-1) theoretically 
purges these effects from firms’ total inventory changes. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This dissertation contains three essays. In the first essay, descriptive statistics 
indicate that, during the event week, firms whose stock prices appreciated in the year 
prior to news of the TRA97 rate cut reaching the market experienced lower returns than 
companies with depreciated equity values. Returns during the event week were larger for 
firms with short-term average holding periods than for companies with long-term 
average holding periods. Firms with individual marginal investors experienced a less-
favorable stock price reaction during the event week than firms with institutional 
marginal investors. Regression results show that firms possessing all three of these 
characteristics (appreciated stock price, long-term average holding period, and individual 
marginal investor) earned lower event-week returns than companies lacking one of more 
of these traits; this response of equity values during the event week is consistent with 
investors anticipating a lessening of the lock-in effect. Although the overall stock price 
reaction to the news of the TRA97 tax rate cut was positive, this response was muted for 
firms with marginal shareholders subject to the new, lower rate (that is, individual 
stockholders with long-term capital gains). These results are robust to a variety of 
alternate sample, model, and variable specifications. 
In the second essay, I determine whether taxes serve as adjustment costs that 
influence the speed at which firms converge on their target leverage ratios. Specifically, 
I hypothesize that, among high-tax firms, companies below their optimal debt levels 
respond more quickly than companies above these targets because high-tax firms can 
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better utilize the interest deductions generated by issuing additional debt to reduce their 
tax liabilities. Conversely, I expect that, among low-tax firms, companies above their 
target capital structures adjust more rapidly than companies below their goals because 
low-tax firms have less need of interest deductions to decrease their tax burdens and thus 
sacrifice less tax benefit when retiring debt. To test these predictions, I use the partial-
adjustment model from Flannery and Rangan (2006). Using a sample of 3,736 firm-year 
observations from years 1981-2000, I begin by replicating the model to verify that the 
explanatory variables impact firms’ market debt ratios as prior research has discovered. 
Then, I employ this methodology to determine if firms’ tax statuses (high or low) have a 
differing impact on the speeds at which they converge on their target leverage ratios 
depending on whether they are currently above or below these optimal levels. I find that, 
among low-tax firms, companies with actual debt ratios above their targets adjust more 
rapidly. This result is consistent with low-tax firms having a greater willingness to retire 
debt because of an inability to benefit from interest deductions. Among high-tax firms, 
companies with actual debt ratios below their targets adjust more quickly. This finding 
indicates that high-tax firms are better able to utilize the interest deductions associated 
with new debt issues to reduce their tax liabilities. 
In the third essay, I extend the tax and financial reporting tradeoff literature by 
studying how taxes influence manufacturing companies’ production decisions in the 
presence of financial reporting incentives. For firms that exceed their earnings 
benchmarks absent production manipulation, book and tax incentives align; thus, I 
predict that these companies make discretionary inventory decreases and that these cuts 
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to production are larger as MTRs rise and in the fourth quarter relative to the first three 
quarters. I find results consistent with these hypotheses. For firms that miss their income 
targets without modifying inventory, book and tax incentives are opposed; therefore, I 
expect that these companies make discretionary inventory increases but that these 
increases are smaller as MTRs climb and in the fourth quarter compared to the previous 
three quarters. The sub-sample of firms that miss their earnings goals provides an 
opportunity to study whether tax or financial reporting considerations dominate in this 
setting. I discover that these companies accelerate production (relative to sales) to 
improve their book income and potentially reach their consensus analyst forecasts. I also 
find that higher MTRs do not prevent these firms from augmenting inventory to increase 
income, but tax timing considerations attenuate this earnings management strategy in the 
fourth quarter. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
DERIVING THE PARTIAL-ADJUSTMENT MODEL 
 
 
MDR*jt =  Xjt (a) 
 Xjt = 1 EBIT_TAjt + 2 MBjt + 3 Dep_TAjt + 4 ln(TA)jt + 5 
FA_TAjt + 6 R&D_Dumjt + 7 R&D_TAjt + 8 Ind_Medjt + 
9 Ratedjt (b) 
MDRjt+1 – MDRjt =  (MDR*jt – MDRjt) + jt+1 (c) 
MDRjt+1 – MDRjt =  (  Xjt – MDRjt) + jt+1 (d) 
MDRjt+1 =  Xjt +(1- ) MDRjt + jt+1 (e) 
In Equation (a), assume that firms’ target debt ratios, represented by MDR*, are 
a function of firm characteristics, represented by X, that prior research has demonstrated 
to impact capital structure.  Equation (b) lists these nine characteristics.  If companies set 
target leverage ratios and rebalance their capital structures to adjust to these targets, 
Model (c) captures this behavior.  The left side represents the change in firms’ debt 
ratios from one year to the next, and the right side represents the difference between 
these companies’ target and actual debt ratios.  Thus,  represents the speed of 
adjustment, the proportion of the gap between firms’ target and actual capital structures 
that closes during one year.  Substituting Equation (a) into Model (c) yields Model (d), 
and rearranging Model (d) algebraically produces Model (e), the partial-adjustment 
model from Flannery and Rangan (2006). 
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APPENDIX B 
 
CALCULATION OF MISS 
 
 
ETRi,q = income taxesi,q (data6) / pretax incomei,q (data23) 
Forecasti,q = the last I/B/E/S consensus forecast estimatei,q (meanest) • common 
shares used to calculate EPSi,q (data15) / (1 – ETRi,q) 
Actuali,q = I/B/E/S actual EPSi,q (value) • common shares used to calculate EPSi,q 
(data15) / (1 – ETRi,q) 
Premani,q = Actuali,q – Earn_effi,q 
If Forecast exceeds Preman, I code Miss as 1.  If Preman exceeds or equals 
Forecast, I code Miss as 0. 
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